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ABSTRACT 
This  paper  is an  essay.  Its spirit is  intended  to  reflect  the 
mood  and  preoccupations generated  by  the  post-1973  recession and  the  re-
emergence  of  disintegrating  factors  and  disequilibria  proper  to the 
depressions  in  the  history of  industrial  societies.  The  central  theme  is 
therefore an  assessment  of  the need  to worry  about  whether  it 
really is all  happening  again.  This  essay  avoids  making  projections but 
rather  attempts  to  identify problem  areas  and  particularly those  contractio-
nary  forces  present  in  the  current  phase  of  the business  cycle. 
Neoclassical  growth  theory  has  developed  the conditions  under 
which  economies  converge  smoothly  to a  path  of steady growth,  aptly called a 
state of  economic  bliss.  This  world  of neoclassical  growth  theory is certain-
Ly  not  the world  we  Live  in,  in  which  dynamic  processes are  much  more  com-
plicated and  erratic  because  the  future  is uncertain.  Unanticipated  shocks 
perturb  the  system,  expected  demand  or expected  relations between  prices 
and  costs  may  turn out  mistaken.  Even  rational  investors  may  end  up  with 
over  - or  underinvestments  once  the  future  unfolds.  To  work  off excess 
capacity or to  reallocate  resources  from  one  market  to another  requires 
substantial  periods of  time  and  introduces monotonic  or cyclical  variations 
into  investments  and  output  of  the  firm. Serial  correlations of this nature 
are  reinforced  by  elastic (i.e., extrapolative)  expectations and  generate 
an  aggregate  business  cycle  since major  economic  variables  (wage  growth, 
government  policy,  world  demand)  affect all sectors of the economy.  Such 
swings  in  economic  activity are  only  reversed  when  floors or ceilings 
are  reached  at  which  economic  agents  become  confident  enough  that the 
likelihood of  a  reversal  of  the  cycle  exceeds  sufficiently the  likelihood 
of  further  deviation  from  long-run  trend. 
Section  2  discusses  the  implications of  slow  ~rowth  (ex-
perienced  since 1973)  and  comes  to  the  conclusion that  Low  growth  trend 
may  be  unstable  and  may  carry  the seed  for a  cumulative downturn.  Slow 
or  zero  growth  may  be  incompatible  with  existing social  institutions and 
expectations and  impedes  distributional  and  allocative mechanisms.  Joint-
Ly  these factors  set  up  endogenous  forces  which  make  for  further  declines 
in  economic  activity.  Whether  this will  occur  in practice depends  mainly 
on  how  rigid economic  structures are.  The  length  of  the  recession in itself - --i i  -
is  important  in this  respect,  since rigidities may  diminish  as  the  re-
cession  is  drawn  out.  On  the other  hand,  expectations  tend  to  become  more 
pessimistic  the  Longer  the  recession  Lasts  and  what  is  considered  as  normal 
business  conditions  is  Likely  to  be  revised  downward. 
Section  3  summarizes  thetheoryof  Long  waves  in economic 
evolution,  called Kondratiev  waves.  Here  it is argued  that  the  Long  expan-
sion  from  1945  to  1973,  culminating  in  a  boom  during  the 1960s,  may  be  con-
sidered  as  the  prosperity phase  of  a  Kondratiev  cycle.  This  contrasts  with 
the Keynesian  view  that  postwar  growth  could  have  been  sustained  indefinitely 
with  proper  policy mixes.  During  the 1970s  many  disequilibria~ built  ~p 
during  the  Long  expansionary  period,  have  become  apparent  which  bear a  strik-
ing  resemblance  to  those associated with  previous  depressions.  These dis-
equilibria  are discussed at  Length  in this  essay  and  it will  suffice to 
give  an  example  here.  From  1945  to  1973  the price of oil steadily 
declined  in  real  terms  while  the  price of  substitute  en~rgies rose. 
This  is  a  clear disequilibrium  phenomenon  since the  equilibrium price path 
of  a  natural  resource  and  of  its substitutes  is characterized by  exponential 
growth  close to  the  real  rate of  interest.  Had  the  price of  energy  evolved 
along  such  a  path  world  growth  would  have  been  Little,  if at all, affected.  But 
by  1973  the disequilibrium  had  reached  such  an  extent  that drastic  cor-
rection  was  required.  It was  the  suddenness  and  size of  the oil price 
increase which  shocked  demand  and  an  industrial  structure developed  on  the 
basis of a  disequilibrium oil price.  Adjustment  of  demand  and,  above  all, 
of  supply  to  the  new  oil price  requires  substantial  time  and  is  made  more 
painful  by  rigidities  in  factor  prices and  the fixity of  productive 
capital  in  the  short-run. 
A disturbing  feature  from  a  European  viewpoint  is the observ-
ed  slower  adaptation  of the  European  economies  to  the  changed  econo-
mic  conditions after  1973,  as  compared  with,  say,  Japan  and  the United 
States.  In  Europe  attitudes towards  economic  growth  have  become  more 
critical" and  demands  for  increased  security  (free of  charge!)  have  tended 
to stifle structural  change,  entrepreneurial  intiative and  creative 
innovation.  Many  European  economies  suffer  now  from  excessive  real  wage 
cost  growth  during  the 1970s  which  has  made  their traditional  industries 
Less  competitive  in  relation to  cheap-Labour  countries.  In addition, - tii  ... 
the  reallocation of  resources  to  future  technology  industries has  been  less 
rapirl  and  less  successful  than  in  Japan  and  the United  State_s.  ~s a  resuLL 
non-public  sector  employment  has  declined  in the  European  Economic 
Community  since  1973  while  it has  increased  in  the  United  States as  never 
before  in  history. 
After  the  failure  of  economic  policies to  control  inflation 
and  to  engineer  a  durable  recovery  the  stagflation,  which  now  enters  into its 
9th  year,  has  considerably  reduced  the earlier confidence  in the  potency_ of 
anti-cyclical  policy.  In  the 1980s  despair  and  helplessness  is  spreading 
among  policy-makers  and  no  general  consensus  is  in  sight  about  a  promising 
policy approach  for  recovery  with  inflation stability. 
Sections  4  and  5  are devoted  to  international  issues.  Section 4 
discusses  the decline  in  international  Leadership  in the 1970s,  the  problems 
inherent  in  the  evolution of  the  international  monetary  system,  the  inter-
national  transmission of  the  business  cycle,  and  the danger  of  rising  pro-
tectionism.  Close  comparisons  with  the  interwar period emerge  again  with 
striking clarity.  The  US  monopoly  of  world  Leadership,  and  perhaps  her 
willingness  to  redistribute the  benefits of  international  exchange,  have 
declined  while  the  new  potential  suppliers of  Leadership,  the  EEC  and 
Japan,  have  not  achieved  yet  the  maturity  and  determination  required  for 
strong  and  effective  Leadership  roles.  While  the  EEC  has  not  been  able to 
realize its full  potential  in  the  past  the  opportunity and  need  for  in-
creased  EEC  Leadership  for  macroeconomic  policy coordination,  for  trade 
policy and  for  the  international  monetary  system  are  now  stronger than ever. 
The  dollar-gold  standard was  abandoned  in 1971  without  implemen-
tation of  any  of  the  grand  proposals  for  international  monetary  reform  in 
vogue  during  the  1960s.  During  the  1970s  world  Liquidity  has  therefore 
expanded  in  a  Largely  uncontrolled  and  erratic  fashion,  contributing  to 
the acceleration of  world  inflation and  to more  rapid growth  of  world con-
sumption  than  investme~t.  At  the  same  time  the  world  economy  had  to 
cope  with  massive  supply  shocks  which  have  been  transmitted  internationally 
in  ways  different  from  more  demand  based  impulses  to which  policy makers 
were  accustomed.  The  world-wide  redistribution of  income  favouring  oil-
exporting  countries  and  newly  industrialized countries  has  made  it more 
difficult to achieve  convergence  in  international  policy  responses  and 
protectionist attitudes  in  industrial  countries  have  once  more  surfaced. - iv -
Finally,  in  financing  the  Large  external  imbalances  accumu-
Lated  during  the  1970s  and  during  1980-82,  commercial  banks  have  encountered 
in 1982  difficulties of  unprecedented  magnitudes  in  the  post~ar_period which 
are discussed  in  Section 5.  This  discussion  focuses  on  risks  in  international 
financial  intermediation and  stresses  the dilemma  in a  situation in  which 
borrowing  countries  either deflate or attempt  to  increase their  indebtedness 
further.  In either case,  and  particularly  in  the  absence  of  a  coordinated 
approach,  country default,  now  and  in  the  future,  is the major  risk,  with 
potential  financial snowballing effects that  could  endanger  financial  stability 
and  build  up  further  depressionary  elements. 
In  Section  6  some  broad conclusions are drawn.  Enough  contractio-
nary  elements  are  in the  economic  pipeline to make  a  Lengthening  or  further 
worsening  of  the  recession plausible.  However,  this  is not  a  forecast.  Some 
expansionary  forces  are  noted  in passing  which,  if  combined  with  judicious 
national  and  international  policies,  could  prevail  over ·the  contractio.nary ones. 1 •  Introduction 
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- In 1965  President  Johnson  was  making 
a  controversial  statement  when  he 
·said:  "I do  not  believe  recessions are 
inevitable".  That  statement  is  no  lon-
ger  controversial.  Recessions are  now 
generally  considered  to  be  fundamentally 
preventable,  Like  airplane crashes  and 
unlike hurricanes.  But  we  have  not 
banished air crashes  from  the  Land,  and 
it is not  clear that  we  have  the wisdom 
or the ability to eliminate  recessions-
Arthur  M.  Okun, 
The  Political  Economy  of  Prosperity. (2) 
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1.  Introduction 
This  paper  is  an  attempt  at  identifying  some  factors  (shocks, 
institutional  malfunctioning,  economic  processes,  policy choices)  that  could 
prolong  and  deepen  the  current  recession further  during  the  years  ahead. 
While  the general  scope  of  these  considerations  is naturally  the  world  eco-
nomy,  industrial  countries  and,  in particular,  the  European  Economic  Com-
munity  (EEC)  receive  particular attention.  No  attempt  is made  at  assessing 
the  Likelihood of occurrence of  particular phenomena  since  in the absence of ob-
servable  event  frequencies  no  objective probabilities are available and 
therefore the  scope  for different  probability beliefs is not  suitably bound-
ed.  Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  none  of  the  factors  discussed are  impossible 
suggests  that  taking  cognizance  might  be  useful  for  policy preparation.  The 
aim  of  this  paper  is  not  to  provide  forecasts  ~r· a  p~ausible ~cenario, 
but  rather  to  draw  attention to possible problems  and  risks  for  economic 
growth  and  international  relations,notwithstanding  many  positive factors 
also discernible  but  not  discussed  in  this paper. 
Recent  experience  in  economic  forecasting  suggests  that  the  ne-
gative factors  at  ~ork are  not  fully apprehended  and  forecasts  have  tended 
to  be  generally overoptimistic.  For  example,  the  Economic  Report  to the 
President,  published  in  February 1982,  provided  the  following  forecast  for 
the  us  economy  on  p.  209:  "The  current  recession  is expected  to  end  early 
in 1982,  followed  by  a  resumption of  growth  by  mid-year."  Commission  fore-
casts of  real  us  GOP  growth  during  1982  were  0.3  per  cent  in  February  1982, 
revised  downward  to- 1.6 per  cent  in  the  May  1982  forecast.  For  the  EEC, 
the  Commission  forecast  a  real  GOP  growth  for 1982  of 2.0 per  cent  in October 
1981,  of  1.4 per  cent  in  May  1982,  and  of 0.3 per  cent  in October  1982. 
The  forecast  of  volume  of  world  imports  for_1982  was  progressively  revised 
from  a  growth  rate  of  4.3  per  cent,  to 2.6  per  cent  and  finally to- 1.0 
per  cent.  Since  other  short-term  forecasts  exhibit  similar patterns, the 
speed  at  which  economic  conditions deteriorate unexpectedly  is o1  some 
concern  and  puts  even  more  seriously  in  doubt  the validity of medium-term 
forecasts  according  to which  growth  will  accelerate again  in  1983. - 2  -
Pessimistic  scenarios  are of  course  prepared  by  several  institu-
tions.  For  example,  the World  Economic  Outlook  (WEO)  of  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  regularly contains  such  a  scenario.  In the  WEO  of  1982 
the average  rate of  GNP  growth  for  industrial  countries over  the  1984-86 
period  is projected at  slightly above  3  per  cent  per  annum  for  the central 
scenario  whiLe  the growth  rate drops to 2  per  cent  under  the  pessimistic 
scenario.  This  projection has  to  be  seen against  a  4.85  per  cent  growth 
for  1963-73,  2.75  per  cent  for  1973-79,  and  1  per  cent  for  the  1980-82 
period.  However,  it is doubtful  that  the  so-called  pessimi~tic scenario 
really  contains  the  major  risks,  since it is  based  on  the assumptions 
that  no  further  shocks  or qualitative  jumps  (country defaults,  higher trade 
restrictiveness)  will  occur.  This  suggests  therefore that  although  an 
average  annual  growth  between  1  and  2  per  cent  for  the  period  1980-86 
is already  a  matter  for  serious  concern,  even  worse  outcomes  are  not  un-
thinkable.  Furthermore,  as  I  shall  argue,  the medium  term  prospects  for 
the  EEC  are  Less  favourable  than  for  Japan  and  the  United  States. 
A useful  framework  for  reflection is provided  by  the  Lessons 
of history.  Although  unanimity  is  Lacking  with  regard  to  the  dominant 
causes of  the  Great  Depression  (Brunner,  1981),  which  was  neither parti-
cularly deep  nor  protracted  compared  to  its predecessors  in  the 19th 
century,  a  substantial  inventory  of  possible causes or contributing  factors 
is available.  They  range  from  mistaken policies  (monetary  and  fiscal  poli-
cies,  exchange  rate policies and  return  to  the gold  standard),  the war 
reparations  problem,  supply  reallocations  for  primary  commodities, 
technological  factors  such  as  a  slowdown  in major  innovations,  psycho-
Logical  factors  generated  by  the  stock  market  crash,  to a  Lack  of  inter-
national  Leadership after  the withdrawal  of  the  United  Kingdom  from  jts 
role  assumed  during  the  19th  century and  the  "belle epoque".  Mutatis 
mutandis,  all  of  these  factorsareapparent  in  todays  world  as  potential 
dangers  and  destabilizing  forces. 
One  explanation of  the Great  Depression  which  assigns only  a 
secondary  role  to  exogenous  events  is  in  my  view  particularly  relevant  for 
an  interpretation of  the  possible evolution  in  the  1980s.  This  is  the  view, 
expounded  by  Schumpeter  <1939),  that  booms  and  depressions are  in  the  na-
ture of  economic  evolution.  Business  cycle theory of  Long  economic  waves 
has  become  Less  fashionable  since the  Keynesian  revolution which  has  been 
taken  to  mean  that  the  business  cycle  can  be  stabilized through  demand - 3  -
management.  However,  Keynesian  theory  is essentialty short-run and  therefore 
only  applicable to  stabilization of  short  cycles.  Those  economists,  notably 
Harrod  and  Hicks,  who  have  developed  the  theory of  long-run  cyclical  evolu-
tion  (the  knife-edge  problem,  multiplier-accelerator models,  floors  and 
ceilings  in trade  cycles)  have  not  had  the  same  influence on  policy thinking, 
possibly  due  to  policy makers'  concern  with  the short  run  and  the  empirical 
difficulty of  assessing  the  more  distant  future. 
The  arguments  in  this paper  are structured as  follows.  Section 2 
develops  some  implications of  the current  slowdown  of growth  and,  for  sharper 
focus,  of  a  zero-growth  scenario.  Section 3  outlines those  economic  factors 
which  generate  long  (Kondratiev)  waves,  and  suggests  the possibility of  a 
fourth  Kondratiev  wave,  with  its expansionary phase  starting after World 
War  II  and  ending  in the mid-seventies.  Section 4  investigates  the major 
problems  embedded  in  international  interdependencies and  Section 5  discusses 
the  risks  inherent  in  international  financial  intermediation.  Conclusions 
are drawn  in  Section 6. 
2.  Implications of  Slow  Growth 
The  average  annual  growth  of  GNP  in  industrial  countries  for  the 
1980-82  period  is projected  at  about  1  per  cent,  and  below  1  per  cent  for 
the  EEC.  While  advocates  of  a  zero-growth  target  may  not  be  particularly con-
cerned  by  the  prospect  of  continued  growth  close to zero,  this section 
shows  that  no  further  adverse  exogenous  shocks  are  required  to move,a  slow-
growing  economy  into actual  decline.  Zero  growth  implies  already major 
breakdowns  of  the  existing  institutional  and  social  tissue  (1).  I  will  not 
(1)  This  view  is  shared  by  Schumpeter  <1939,  p.  1033)  who  notes:  "Capitalism is 
essentially a  process of  economic  change.  Without  that  change  or,  more 
precisely,  that  kind  of  change  which  we  have  called evolution,  capi-
talist society  cannot  exist.  Maladjustments,  unemployment  and  und~r­
utilization of  resources  ••• ,and neutral,  unstable,  and  subnormal 
equilibria might  hence  well  stay with  a  non-expanding  world". - 4  -
explain  why  an  economy  is growing  slowly,  nor  analyze the possibility of 
reversing  the trend.  My  concern  is to  note  the  negative  implications of 
slow  growth  which  may  in fact  prevail  over  some  positive factors.  What 
then are  the  implications of  continuing  slow  growth  ? 
With  zero  growth  of  production employment  remains  at  best  con-
stant,  and  is  in  fact  declining  with  technological  progress  and  labour-
saving  investments.  Although  productivity growth  is  likely 
to  continue  its downward  trend it is unlikely  that  it will. not  remain 
slightly positive.  Zero  growth  then  implies  a  decline  in employment  by  the 
rate  of  productivity growth,  and  because  in many  EEC  countries entries  into 
the  labour  force  are  expected  to accelerate until  the  mid-1980s,  the  growth 
of  unemployment  will  rise  above  the  rate due  to  employment  decline.  Since 
unemployment  compensations  are  not  managed  on  insurance principles a  con-
stant or  increasing  level  of  unemployment  requires  a  constant  or  increasing 
transfer of  income  from  the  employed  to-the~employed. The  full  impacts 
of these transfers are  not  felt  yet,  although  rational  agents  would  anti-
cipate them,  since governments  have  allowed  public  sector deficits to  in-
crease.  But  in  a  stationary  economy  the  public  sector cannot  run  a  deficit 
forever,  and  is  therefore  forced  to  increase taxation or to  reduce  its 
expenditures  over  time.  Therefore  either  some  social  services will  not  be 
provided  anymore  or  taxation of all or  some  income  groups  has  to  increase 
with  unfavourable  implications  for  incentives  to  work,  save  and  invest  (2). 
In many  countries  funds  are already  being  curtailed for  infrastructural 
investments  (the  problems  of  cities), education,  research,  state sup-
ported  big  investment  projects  (energy)  and  cuts  are  envisaged  in socially 
particularly sensitive areas  such  as  pensions,  unemployment  compensations, 
and  medical  care.  Some  of  these  expenditure  reductions  may  be  compensated 
(2)  Estimation of  these effects  is difficult and  somewhat  unreliable 
since it requires  a  general  equilibrium  framework.  However,  recent 
work  shows  that  the  substitution effects  tend  to be  much  stronger 
than  what  was  suggested  by  earlier  empiric~l investigations.  See,  for 
example,  Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  (1980). - 5  -
by  increased  rationality  in  the  use  of available  resources  but  beyond  that 
the decline  in  public  investment  represents~he seeds  for  further  deteriora-
tion of  Long-run  growth  perspectives. 
Economic  growth  is characterised by  gradual  elimination of 
industries  for  which  demand  is declining  and  rapid growth  of  those  in-
dustries  for  which  demand  expands.  This  reallocation of  resources,  while 
never  easy,  is facilitated  by  the  prospects of  achieving  high  incomes,  higher 
returns  to  capital  and  of  providing  managerial  challenges.  In  a  stationary 
economy  decline  of  any  industry  is  seen  as  a  threat  to  employment  and  as  a 
Loss  of  capital  so  that  all  owners  of  the factors  of  production  resist  the 
change  and  seek  public  assistance for  protecting  their  interests.  Savings 
therefore become  increasingly channeled  into  Low  productivity  industries 
instead of  being  used  for  creating a  brighter future.  Moreover,  ailing 
industries are  usually badly  managed  partly because bright  managers  avoid 
those  industries.  As  Thurow  (1980,  p.  81)  notes:  "Who  wants  a  job  where 
the  basic  problem  is  to  decide  whom  to fire  each  day  and·  where  new,  ex-
citing  investments  are  not  happening?  In  a  dying  industry  everyone  is out 
to  protect  what  they  have  rather  than  to  build  something  better.  They 
know  that  gains  in efficiency will  simply  result  in more  Layoffs". 
A stationary  economy  is  bound  to  face  increased distributional 
problems,  brilliantly discussed  by  Thurow.  In  the  present  context  it is 
useful  to  distinguish  domestic  and  international  issues of  income  distri-
bution.  Both  have  in  common  that  with  growth  distribution is a  "non-zero 
sum  game"  while  without  growth  redistribution  imposes  absolute welfare 
Losses  on  some  segments  of  society.  Within  each  country  society  can  be dis-
sected  into  various,  often overlapping  groups  contending  for  their 
distributional  share:  Labour  against  capital,  the  employed  against  the 
unemployed,  the  retired and  those  preparing  for  entry  into  the  Labour 
force,  private sector against  public  sector,  tenured  Labour  against  un-
tenured  Labour,  rich  regions  against  poorer  regions,  etc.  This  climate 
is  likely  to  produce  non-negligible efficiency  Losses:  disincentives  to 
work  or  to  invest  in  physical  capital  when  marginal  returns  are decreased 
to  finance  high  transfer  payments;  to  invest  in education  when  job 
prospects  are  meager;  incentives  to abandon  the private sector and  to 
enter  secure,  public  service  jobs;  and,  more  directly,  increased general 
unrest  and  strikes.  The  most  important  of all efficiency  Losses  result-
ing  from  the  distributional  battle is  however  resistance to  economic  change. - 6  -
Particularly  in  Europe,  the often praised social  achievements  repr~ 
sent a_t the present:-tirne a danger  for  European  societies  to  cope  with  change. 
On  the  one  hand  economic  agents  (income  earners,  firms,  government)  have 
become  accustomed  to  expect  rising  real  incomes  over  the  life cycle  with  ma-
jor  risks  being  taken  care of  by  government.  But  the external  income  trans-
fers  (oil), the  loss  of  European  competitivity,  and  the  internal  transfers 
(unemployment  compensation,  pension  payments  with  declining  birth  rates,  ex-
pansion  of  unproductive  jobs,  free  education  with  rising  participation 
rates,~ etc.)  make  it virtually  impossible  to  satisfy all.these aspirations. 
Some  signs  of  a  gradual  disintegration of  those  institutions  can  already 
be  witnessed  in  several  European  countries.  The  inherent  dangers  are  twofold, 
each  potentially very  serious.  On  the  one  hand,  politico-social  turmoil  and 
unrest,  if present  institutions are disintegrated  too disruptively;  on  the 
other  hand,  lack  of  responsiveness  to  the  external  challenge  if present  insti-
tutions  are  not  adapted  in  time.  Perhaps  the first danger  is  not  as  serious 
as  the  second  judging  by  the  lack  of  violent  reactions  to  current  policies 
in  the  United  Kingdom,  while  the decline  of  Belgium  is a  very  preoccupying 
example  of  institutional  rigidities preventing  spontaneous  or policy in-
duced  structural  adjustment. 
Poor  countries  will  also  suffer  from  slow  growth  in  industrial 
countries  since the  growth  of  aid  is  Likely  to decline absolutely and  as  a 
share  of  industrial  countries'  GNP.  But  reduced  aid will  aggravate  the diffi-
culties of  poor  nations,  force  a  decline  in their absorption  and  hence 
diminish  their demand  for  exports of  industrial  countries. 
A further  international  phenomenon  will  contribute to  turning 
the  stationary economy  in  fact  to a  declining  economy.  The  working  hypothesis 
of  this  section  has  been  a  constant  Level  of  production  without  any  ex-
planation of  how  prices  evolve.  In a  closed  economy  government  intervention 
and  rigidities  in  behavior of  wage  earners may  Lead to  a  fairly  rigid re-
Lative  price structure.  This  is,however,  impossible  in an  international 
environment  with  an  unchanged  degree  of  protectionism.  With  a  slowly  growing 
world  economy  competition  is bound  to  intensify  and  there will  always  be - 7 -
some  economies  which  will  do  better  than others.  When  competition  increases 
and  productivity grows  faster  in  some  countries prices of  these  competitors 
will  decline.  The  stationary  economy  will  then  see its world  market  share 
decline  (so  that  domestic  production declines)  or  its terms  of  trade worsen. 
Alternatively,  it may  try to  avoid  these  Losses  and  take  refuge  behind  a 
growing  protectionist  wall  to discover  that  one  form  of  welfare  Loss  is  traded 
for  another  that  may  be  even  more  serious. 
The  conclusion of  this section is  therefore that  the  initial 
hypothesis of  a  stationary  economy  is  untenable.  A stationary economy  is 
bound  to  evolve  into a  declining  economy  with  an  array of  the most  serious 
internal  and  external  difficulties until  some  of  the  institutional factors 
responsible  for  slow  growth  in  the first  place will  give way,  or until  the 
(3)  world-wide  business  cycle  improves 
3.  Are  Long-run  Economic  Cycles  Obsolete  ? 
Relatively  steady  growth  in  the  post-war  period  combined  with  the 
confidence  based  on  Keynesian  stabilization theory,  has  tended  to divert 
attention away  from  Long-run  business  cycles  to  the  extent  that  many  have 
considered  them  to  be  obsolete  (4).  Only  recently  have  economists  started 
(3)  I  refer  to  institutions  since as  documented  by  economic  history this 
is a  prime  factor  in  explaining differences  in  economic  growth  patterns 
between  countries.  For  example,  the first industrial  revolution did  not 
take  place  in  England  simply  because  of  some  technological  inventions 
which  somehow  occurred there and  not  elsewhere.  The  institutions of 
18th  century  England  Liberated  the  Latent  scientific  and  entrepreneurial 
energies  which  were  still brideled  in most  parts of  continental  Europe. 
Similarly,the  slow  postwar  growth  of  the  United  Kingdom  is not  due  to 
exogenously  determined  work  habits,  a  Lower  human  capital  (quite  the 
contrary!),  or  a  Lower  and  outdated  initial capital  stock  (in an  economy 
with  Low  frictions  old  capital  is  replaced  by  new  capital  when  this  is 
economical),  but  is mainly  due  to  institutional differences.  See  Landes 
(1968)  and  Shonfield  (1965). 
(4)  See,  for  example,  Bronfenbrenner  (1969). - 8  -
again  to  turn their attention to  the  long-run dynamics  of  economic  evolu-
tion  recognizing  that  some  major  economic  phenomena  are realized  only  with 
very  long  lags:  research  and  development,  investment  and  capital  accumula-
tion,  change  in  economic  structure,  reversing  inflationary expectations, 
(5)  etc. 
The  reason  for  which  I  invoke  business  cycle theory  and  in par-
ticular the  theory of  long  waves  is to  draw  attention to  institutional  and 
structural  characteristics and  the  long-run  implications of  short-term 
stabilization.  This  opens  up  a  framework  within  which  recent  economic  evo-
lution  can  be  seen and  some  potential  future difficulties can  be  appreciat-
ed.  Although  I  consider  this  framework  as  a  useful  one,  I  do  not  suggest 
that  history  repeats  itself in the  sense  that  there is a  repetitive rigid 
timing  pattern or  that the  driving  forces  are  invariant  from  one  cycle to 
the  next,  nor  do  I  suggest  that  depressions  are  unavoidable.  Since the 
1930s  many  institutional and  technological  changes  have  occured  that 
dampen  the amplitude  and  phase  of  economic  cycles  (creation of  institutio-
nal  safeguards,  international  cooperation,  automatic  stabilizers,  in-
creased  speed  of  technological  change).  To  begin,  I  shall  sketch  the 
hypothesis of  long  waves  in  economic  evolution and  then  note  the  salient 
features  of  the  expansion  phase  until 1973  and  the adverse  factors  bred 
during  the  end  of  the  boom. 
3.1  The  Kondratiev  Long  Waves 
Starting with  the first industrial  revolution  "long  waves"  last-
ing  over  half-a-century can  be  observed  in the  evolution of  industrial 
countries.  Kondratiev  (1926)  elaborated  the statistical evidence  for  the 
existence of  such  long  waves  but  failed  in providing  any  convincing 
explanation  of  an  internal  mechanism  which  would  generate  long  waves  with 
alternating  periods of  expansion  and  depression  (6). It was  Schumpeter  (1939) 
(5)  One  manifestation of this  reorientation is the  recent  rediscovery 
of  "supply  economics". 
(6)  Depression  is  usually  defined  as  a  "long''  period of  time  during  which 
the  trend  of  economic  growth  exhibits a  marked  decline,  without  be-
coming  necessarily negative.  The  decline  in price  levels,  considered 
as  an  important  feature  of  economic  depressions  in the  19th  century, 
is clearly not  of  the  same  relevance any  more. (3) 
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who  first  succeeded  in offering  an  explanation of  why  in  the  race  between 
Labour  absorption  in  new  activities and  labour  displacements  in establish-
ed  industries,  one  process  draws  ahead  for  a  long  time  period and  the  other 
develops in consequence. 
Schumpeter's  interpretation is based  on  technological  revolutions or 
"innovations"  (?)  as  the main  motor  of  Long  cycles,  but  his  interpretation 
is  not  confined  to  technology:  social  changes  and  financial  conditions are 
seen  by  him  as  related  endogenous  factors  reinforcing  the technological 
components.  He  negates  any  belief  in  a  rigid timing  pattern for  Long  waves 
(e.g.  25-30  years  of  expansion  followed  by  a  depression of  comparable 
Length)  but  stresses  the  underlying  endogenous  dynamics  producing  long  waves 
which  may  be  lengthened,  shortened,  accentuated  or  attenuated  by  a  host 
of  factors  including  policies. 
Why  does  innovational  activity  tend  to  produce  Long  waves  ?  To 
emphasize  the  present  day  relevance  of  the arguments,  I  shall  not  confine 
myself  to historical  factors  but  draw  more  extensively on  modern  observa-
tions.  Consider  as  a  first  step for  sketching  the basic  argument  the 
implications of  the  theory of  the  "product  cycle".  New  products  are 
usually  developed  by  one  or  few  producers  using  a  technological  break-
through  or  simply  identifying  new  demands.  At  the  initial stage  firms  satis-
fy  the  upper  segments  of  the  demand  curve,  selling  thus  at  high  prices 
and  amortising  initial  set-up  costs.  Marginal  production  costs are  of  little 
importance  so  that  production  requires  less efficiency and  can  take  place 
in  high-wage-cost  countries.  Over  time,  as  the  product  is being  developed 
for  a  mass-market,  production  costs become  increasingly decisive and 
firms  are  compelled  to  rationalize production;  in  the process, 
Labour-intensive  production  may  even  be  moved  to  Low-wage  countries.  This 
process  tends  to  be  accelerated by  new  competitors  entering  the market 
and  declining  profit  margins.  Economies  able to generate continously  new 
products  or  processes or to  perfect  existing ones  will  be  able to sustain 
high  growth,  those  not  able  to  do  so  will  experience  Lower  growth.  Hence, 
(7)  Technological  change  has  to  be  understood  in a  wide  sense,  including 
management  techniques,  organisational  forms,  and  market  organisation. - 10  -
economic  cycles  can  be  seen  to derive  from  the ability to  innovate  and  to 
exploit  effectively the  growth  and  maturity  phases  of  the  product  cycle. 
Even  if the  probabiLity  laws  of  economic  events  were  independently 
distributed over  industries  and  over  time  (which  they are  not),  particular 
constellations of  events  are  capable  of  producing  qualitative changes,  not 
unlike  biological  mutations,  setting off periods of growth  or of decline. 
Hence,  economic  cycles  derive  from  serial  correlation in economic  time  series, 
the covariance  among  major  economic  variables,  21nd  the "mutations"  (struc-
tural  changes)  produced  either  by  shocks  or  endogenously  by  particular per-
formance  structures. 
Long  waves  only  result  from  innovations  if they  are discontinous, 
that  is bunched  together  with  economy-wide  repercussions.  Schumpeter  asso-
ciates with  the  three  Kondratiev  cycles  known  at  his  time  the  development 
of  steam  power,  of  railroads  and  electric  power,  and  of  the  automobile: 
technological  revolutions  with  sizeable secondary  effects and  very  strong 
economy-wide  repercussions  capable  of  producing  high  serial  ·correlation 
of  innovative activity. 
The  reasons  for  the  emergence  of  a  turning  point  in a  Kondratiev 
long  wave  now  have  to  be  identified to substantiate Clement  Juglar's  claim 
that'~he only  cause  of  depression  is prosperity''.  During  the upswing  there 
will  of  course  be  some  labour  displacement  as  new  technologies  are intro-
duced  but  on  a  relatively  small  scale.  Aggregate  employment  expands  due  to 
a  steep  increase  in  employment  in the  industries and  services directly 
associated with  the  new  technologies  and  Later  in other  complementary 
industries.  New  technologies  require  specific  skills and  it usually  takes 
decades  to  train engineers  and  to  sufficiently increase the  supply~of workers 
with  specific  skills.  Temporary  shortages generate  scarcity  rents  and 
a  general  upward  pressure  on  all wage  rates  through  comparability  claims. 
This,  in  turn~will ultimately  increase the pressure to adopt  labour-
saving  technologies,  reinforced  by  the arguments  of  the  product  cycle. 
Social  resistance  to  rationalization also dwindles  decades  after the 
first  introduction of  new  technology.  The  cost  and  performance advantages, 
at first debatable,  become  more  and  more  obvious,  particularly when  the  new 
skills become  more  abundant,  when  managers  familiar  with  the  new  techno-
logy  emerge  and  designs  are  standardised  and  simplified.  At  least  in our 
century,  international  competitive pressures  reinforce the  rationalization 
process. - 11  -
While  the  previous  arguments  give  some  support  to the  hypothesis  that  long 
waves  are generated  by  technological  innovations  they  are  not  sufficient 
to  explain  why  at  the  end  of  a  Kondratiev  upswing,  generated by  a  bunching 
of  innovations,  another  innovative bunching  does  not  occur  and,  instead, 
only  arises after  a  depression.  Explanation of this phenomenon  relies on 
additiona~but interrelated factors.  One  is the  establishment  of a 
technological  "paradigma",  paraphrasing  Kuhn
1s  (1962)  terminology:  it is 
easier  to  expand  and  improve  existing  and·known  technology  than to  launch 
entirely  new  ones.  Hence,  during  the  expansionary  phase  of  the Kondratiev 
cycle  competitive  and  innovative pressure  is directed at  improving  and 
rationalizing existing  rather  than at developing  new  technologies.  During 
the downturn  these  pressures  become  extreme  and  innovative possibilities 
become  more  limited  so  that  the  research  for entirely new  technologies 
intensifies.  Since  new  technology  requires  Long  lead  times  (often decades) 
to  become  economically  usable  the  new  technological  breakthrough  is  likely 
to occur  well  after the  turning  point. 
A reinforcing  factor  is that  during  the  end  of  an  expansionary 
phase  the  incentives  and  social  conditions are  not  optimally suited 
for  big  Leaps  in  technological  development:  increasing bureaucratisation, 
growing  rigidities obstructing  resource  reallocations,  and  higher  taxation 
to  finance  transfer  payments  are  some  of the institutional disincentives al-
ready  discussed.  Furthermore,  relying  on  a  political economy  approach, 
Olson  <1982)  argues  that  during  Long  periods of  expansion  societies 
accumulate  interest groups  and  collusions  for  redistributive actions  and 
undergo  a  process  of  increasing  economic  concentration.  One  important 
implication  is that  "distributional  coalitions  slow  down  a  society's 
capacity  to  adopt  new  technologies  and  establish  barriers to entry that 
reduce  a  society•s  capacity  to  reallocate  resources  quickly  in  response 
to  changing  conditions,  and  thereby  reduce  the  rate of  economic  growth" 
(Olson,  p.  145).  Recession  (and  wars)  are  seen  in that  framework  as 
factors  that  upset  the  process of  increasing distributional  coalition 
formation~ The  rapid post-war  growth  of  Gefmany  and  Japan  is consistent 
with  this  framework. - 12  -
Introduction of  new  technologies  initially requires  increased 
investments.  Over  time  wage  earners  receive  the  benefit  of  higher  pro-
ductivity and  possibly more,  as  has  been  the  case  in  recent  years.  Rein-
forced  by  stiffer  competition due  to market  penetration by  newcomers, 
profit  shares  tend  to decline  in  the  Late  phases  of  the  boom,  and  the 
means  and  incentives  for  capacity  expansion diminish.  At  the  same  time 
Labour-saving  technological  progress  raises  the  required  investment  for 
maintaining  a  high  employment  growth  path. 
The  role  of  business  expectations  in this  process  is admirably 
~described by  Keynes  (1936,  pp.  315-17): 
"The  Later  stages of  the  boom 
are  characterised  by  optimistic  expectations as  to  the  future  yield of 
capital  goods  sufficiently strong  to offset their growing  abundance  and 
their  rising  costs of  production and,  probably,  a  rise  in  the  rate of 
interest also.  It  is of  the  nature of  organised  investment  markets  ••• , 
that,  when  disillusion falls  upon  an  over-optimistic  and  over-bought  market, 
it, "(a  reasonable  estimate of  the  future  yield  of  capital  assets)" 
should  fall  with  sudden  and  catastrophic  force  •••  It is the  return of  con-
fidence  •••  which  is  so  insusceptible to  control  in an  economy  of  indi-
vidualistic  capitalism"(8). 
Once  the  turning  point  of  the  Long  wave  is  reached  many  factors 
tend  to  mutually  reinforce  the  downturn  as  has  become  apparent  in  Section 2. 
Furthermore,  declining  growth  in  industrial  countries  exerts  a  downward 
pressure on  commodity  prices  and  hence  on  the  income  of  commodity  ex-
porting  countries,  many  of  which  are  in the  developing  stage.  Due  to  the 
dependency  of  developing  countries on  few  basic  commodities  export  earnings 
of  these  countries decrease and  make  it difficult for  these  countries  to 
service  and  repay  the  international  Loans  accumulated  during  the  commodity 
boom  of  the  expansionary  phase.  International  financial  crises develop  with 
contractionary  impacts  in  Lending  countries  (further discussed  in Section 5) 
and  borrowing  countries are  compelled  to deflate their economies  thereby 
affecting  exports  of  Lending  countries. 
(8)  Investment  behavior  with  some  of  these features  is endogenised  in  the 
simulation model  developed  by  Forrester  <1976).  He  uses  a  two-sector 
economy  producing  consumer  and  capital  goods.  Impulses  from  the  con-
sumer  goods  sector are  transmitted  with  Long  Lags  to  the capital  pro-
ducing  sector.  Through  a multiplier-accelerator mechanism  the inter-
dependence  between  both  sectors  has  the  potential  of  producing  fluctu-
ations of  a  SO-years  duration,  basically because  investors  exaggerate 
continuously  (but  ex-ante with  perfect  rationality)  in either direction. - 13  -
Due  to  each  country's  attempt  to  increase world market  shares 
and  to  protect  domestic  production  from  imports,  recessions  are characte-
rized by  increasing  trade protection,  Lesser  obeyance  to  the  Laws  of  com-
parative advantage  and  more  conflictual  international  relationships  con-
taining  the  risk  of  de~enerating into (trade) wars,  further  discussed  in 
Section  4. 
An  attempt  is  now  made  to apply this  sketchily outlined  frame-
work  of  the  Kondratiev  cycle  to  the  postwar  period,  and  to  see whether  • 
a  turning  point  of  a  fourth  Kondratiev  cycle might  have  occurred  in the 
1970s. 
But  before  that  we  may  ask  whether  the  view  of  Long  waves  does  not 
run  counter  to  Keynesian  wisdom?  I  would  argue  that  is does  not.  The 
traditional  controversy  about  Keynesian  stabilization policies  concerns 
only  the  question  whether  policy makers  can  stabilize  aggreg~te demand. 
It does  not  concern  issues  such as shifts  in  demand  for  individual  industries 
requiring  restructuring  of  the  productive side of  the  economy.  Nor  does 
it concern  supply  growth  or  random  shocks  to  the  productive  structure of 
an  economy.  In  the  wake  of  the  supply  shocks  of  the 1970s  the awareness 
that  Long-run  cycles  might  still be  alive has  therefore been  heightened 
again.  In  fact,  if the  post-war  period until 1973  is  regarded  as  the 
prosperity phase  of  the Kondratiev-cycle,  the absence  of  deep  recessions 
in  industrial  countries  for  about  a  quarter  of  a  century  appears  as  a 
standard  feature  of  traditional  business  cycle theory,  and  provides  no  evi~ 
dence  for  the  view  that  Long  waves  are dead. 
3.2  The  Period  of  Expansion  (1945-1973) 
After  World  War  II  the  need  for  reconstruction provided  a  major 
impetus  for  growth  (9), and  was  singularly aided  by  the  strong  international 
Leadership  assumed  by  the  United  States.  The  desire to avoid  a  recurrence 
of  the  interwar  experience  Led  to  the  creation of  the Bretton  Woods  system, 
and  to  the  trading  rules  embodied  in  the  GATT.  Furthermore,  direct  financial 
assistance was  made  available  for  the  reconstruction of  Europe  as  Later  aid 
was  madP  available  for  LDCs. 
(9)  Wars  represent  important  turning  points  for  Long  waves,  both  at  the 
ceiling  and  at  the  floor. - 14  -
Under  these  extremely  favourable  institutional  conditions  in-
dustrial  countries  not  only  were  able  to grow  rapidly but  they also 
became  aware  of  the mutual  benefits  from  international  exchange.  Successive 
GATT  rounds  of tariff and  quantitative trade barrier  reductions,  the 
creation of  the  EEC,  international  financial  integration and  international 
policy  cooperation all advanced  significantly on  the understanding  that 
there was  a  "public  good"  to  be  shared.  Productivity grew  at unpreceden-
ted  rates as  international  competition  shook  up  previously protected 
domestic  industries;  as  foreign  trade  allowed  a.greater exploitation of 
returns  to  scale from  increasing  specialisation;  as demand  was  made  more 
uniform  in  the  entire Western  world,  satisfied by  multinational  companies, 
and  as  the  Life  of  the  product  cycle  shortened  under  the  impact  of accelera-
ted  innovation  and  product  development.  In  Europe  the  return to full  em-
ployment  was  extremely  rapid  and  already  in the  1960s  Europe  had  to  rely 
on  immigration  for  incremental  Labour  supplies. 
After  the  period of  reconstruction,  Europe  continued  to  grow 
rapidly  during  the  1960s  aided  by  exceptionally  high  growth  in the United 
States  and  by  the  maintained  overvaluation of the  US  dollar which  was  reflec-
ted  in declining  US  trade  surpluses.  These  factors  and  LDCs'  needs  combined 
to  stimulate European  "export-Led" growth. 
As  to  technology,  Europe  benefitted from  the  "technology-gap" 
and  could  confine  herself  to adapting  best-practice techniques.  In a 
Schumpeterian  sense  four  sectors  played  Leading  roles:  construction 
for  the  period of  reconstruction  (the  "building  boom"- Shonfield,  1965); 
automobiles,  similarly to  the  role played  in the  United  States during  the 
third Kondratiev  upswing,  and  mechanical  and  electrical engineering  to 
reequip  European  industry  and  LDC  economies;  and,  most  so  in  the  United 
States,  electronics.  The  inter-industry  repercussions of  these  sectors 
are  extremely  important:  upstream  for  construction and  automobiles, 
downstream  for  engineering  and  the  electronics  industry.  For  example, 
while  actual  employment  in  the u.s.  computer  industry itself is  not 
very  big,  overall  employment  in downstream  service industries  is very 
sizeable.The  industry-wide  impulses  are  comparable  to  those  of  the 
steamengin~ the  railways  and  electricity in their times,  making  possible 
the  creation of activities  unthinkable  without  computers.  It is estimated 
that,  at  Least  during  the  1950s  and  1960s,  the  introduction of  computers 
and  related  equipment  was  employment-creating  and  not  employment-
destructing  (Freeman,  1978).  However,  as  the  result of mature  and  cheap 
computer  technology  (e.g., Large  scale  integration  chips  replacing discrete 
components),  produced  with  enormous  scale economies  and  facilitating - 15  -
automation  in  industry  and  services,  the  Labour-displacing  effect  has 
sharply  increased  in  the 1970s,  reinforced by  the  strongly  increased 
cost  of  Labour  (Sachs,  1979). 
3.3  The  Slowdown  of  Expansion  (1974-1982) 
Table  I  summarizes  average  growth  rates of  real  wages,  employment, 
productivity  and  GNP  in  the  European  Economic  Community,  the  United  States 
and  Japan. 
The  average growth  rate of  real  GOP  during  the  period 1974-80 
is  in all  three areas  Less  than  half the average  growth  rate for  the 
period  1961-73  with  a  further  deterioration  in  1981  and  1982  ' 10'. In  the 
EEC  and  Japan  productivity growth  for  1974-80  was  Less  than  half the 
average  growth  during  1961-73  and  in  the  United  States the  productivity decline  was 
even  stronger.  A further  ~trong deceleration has  occurred  everywhere  during 
1980-82.  By  contrast,  employment  growth  in the  United  States was  sustained 
during  1974-80  above  the  pre-1973  Levels  while  in the  EEC  it declined  to  Less 
than  half  the  rate achieved  during  1961-73,  and  in  Japan  the decline  was 
slightly  Less.  Employment  growth  slowed  down  further  during  1980-82, 
the  two-years  average  growth  rate declining  to 0.25  per  cent  in  the 
United  States and  to -1.3  per  cent  in the  EEC.  The  combined  effects of 
the  productivity  slowdown  and  the  employment  decline  resulted  in  about 
zero  output  growth  for  1980-82  in the  United  States and  the  EEC.  By  at 
Least  one  traditional  definition of aKondratiev depression,  based  on  a 
significant  downward  shift of  the trend  in  GOP  growth,  the world  economy 
has  already  entered  into a  depression.  In this text  I  shall  comply, 
however,  with  the official  fiction of  calling the  current  situation a 
recession. 
C10)  Official  data  on  GOP  growth  are  however  underestimates  due  to  the 
rapid growth  of  the  "underground  economy"  which  could  now  account 
for  over15  per  cent  of  measured  GOP  in many  industrial  countries 
compared  to  Less  than  10  per  cent  in the  early 1960s.  See  Tanzi  C1982). - 16  -
Table  1:  Growth  of  real  wages,  productivity,  employment  and  output 
Real  wage  increases  (%  p.a.) 
(using  CPI  as  deflator) 
EEC 
United  States 
Japan 
Productivity  growth  (GOP  at  Factor 
Cost  (per  person  employed)  (%  p.a.) 
EEC 
United  States 
Japan 
Unemployment  rate 
EEC 
United  States 
Japan 
Employment  growth  (%  p.a.) 
EEC 
United  States 
Japan 
Output  growth  (GOP  at  Factor  Cost) 
(%  p.a.) 
EEC 
United  States 
Japan 
1961-73 ' 1) 
5,0 
2,5 
7,6 
4,4 
2,2 
8,5 
(1970) 
2,0 
4,9 
1,1 
0,2 
1,9 
1,3 
4,9 
4,1 
9,9 
1974-80(1) 
2,6 
0,1 
2,5 
(1976) 
4,8· 
8,5 
1,9 
o, 1 
2,1 
0,9 
2,2 
2,3 
3,8 
0,9 
1,4 
2,5 
0,9 
0,9 
1,2 
( 1981) 
7,8 
7,6 
2,2 
-1,5 
1,1 
0,8 
-0,6 
2,0 
3,0 
1982 (2) 
0,3 
0,9 
3,4 
1,5 
-1,0 
2,0 
( 1982) 
9,4 
9,4 
2,3 
-1,1 
-0,6 
0,5 
0,3 
-1,6 
2,5 
(1)  Average  percentage  increase for  the  period.  Source:  Real  Wages  and  Employ-
ment,  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  Doc.  II/214/82-E/rev.  1. 
(2)  Commission  forecasts:  September-October  1982. (4) 
- 17  -
Although  it is  customary  to assign to  the oil  shocks  of  the  1970s 
the major  responsibility  for  the  slowdown  in  economic  activity, it is quite 
obvious  that  sooner  or  Later  a  slowdown  would  have  occurred  anyhow.  No 
phenomenon  can  grow  at an  exponential  rate forever  without  being  thwarted 
by  some  constraint  - which  was  the  main  message  of  the  Club  of  Rome  Report. 
Therefore,  apart  from  timing  and  exact  magnitudes,  the  rise  in oil prices 
would  have  occurred  even  without  OPEC.  Other  raw  material  prices also  in-
creased  strongly  in  real  terms  in the  1970s  without  cartel  formations  as  they 
had  increased  during  previous  Late  expansionary  phases of  the  Kondratiev  cycle. 
Similarly,  concern  for  the  environmental  repercussions  of  growth  was,  sooner 
or  Later,.a.n inevitable consequence  of  growth.  Of  equal importance are  technolo-
gical  factors  and  a  number  of  changes  in attitudes,  institutions,  and  econo-
mic  relations  develop~d during  the  expansion  which  ultimately produce  endo-
( 11)  genously  a  slowdown 
(i)  A general  attitude against  growth 
This  is  exemplified  by  the  growth  of  various  anti-growth  movements 
since  the  mid-1960s  ("zero  growth  targets",  "small  is beautiful",  ''back  to 
nature").  The  ramifications  of these movements  are diverse,  influencing  work 
attitudes,  emphasizing  redistributive policies and  the quality of  growth 
among  other.  Two  of  considerable  importance are the  ecologist  and  anti-nuclear 
movements.  In  some  countries  they  have  successfully delayed  major  investment 
programs  in  nuclear  energy  and  other  polluting  industries.  Thus  growth  can 
breed  general  anti-growth  attitudes which  produce  major  constraints on  the 
growth  process  istself before  the full  opportunity  cost of  slower  growth  is 
being  realized. 
(11)  "The  rapid  economic  progress  which  Liberal  international  policy makes 
possible,  generates  growing  expectations of  further  progress  which,  foment-
ed  and  exploited  by  the politicians, eventually outgrow  the  system's 
capacity  to deliver.  The  popular  expectations  focus  on  stability in 
particular:  stability not  only of one's  income  but of  o~e's position 
in  the  social  group,  and  thus  of  the  rate of growth  of one's  income  and  of 
its  relation to  the  incomes  of others.  Eventually,  a  degree of stability 
comes  to  be  desired  which  makes  stable progress  impossible.  Economic 
progress  implies  novelty  and  social  adaptation to it. But  before this 
insight  dawns  upon  the  society,  the state has  been  called upon,  and 
has  promised  to make  progress possible without  change".  (Tumlir,  1978, 
pp.  6-7). - 18  -
Cii)  A general  struggle for  more  security 
At  the  beginning  of  the prosperity  phase  Labour  supply tends  to 
be  quite elastic.  As  prosperity  spreads  and  consumption  patterns adjust  the 
elasticity of  Labour  supply declines  whilst  the demand  for  security and  con-
solidation of  acquired positions tends  to  increase.  This  is  reflected  in 
private contracts  (the  insurance  industry grows  at  a  faster  rate than  GNP 
everywhere),  in  political  institutions  (unemployment  compensation,  retirement 
plans>,  global  wage  bargaining  <Length  of  contracts,  wage  indexation, 
barriers to  Lay-offs)  and  the trend of  Labour  supply  towards  secure  jobs 
(12)  (public  service  jobs) 
Similarly,  and  in accordance  with  the  framework  suggested  by 
Olson  (1982),  the  entrepreneurial  function  becomes  increasingly institutio-
nalized  within  Large  business organisations  (increasing  economic  concentra-
tion)  and  in government/private  sector  relationships  comp~Lling government 
more  and  more  to  stimulate  investment  and  research,  to provide protection 
for  business  and  eventually to avoid busines failures.  Sustained growth  for 
more  than  two  decades  has  induced  workers,  corporations and  governments 
to  consider  security  as  a  ''public  good",  hence  to be  produced  by  government. 
During  the  phase  of  expansion  entrepreneurial activity is  richly 
remunerated,  to  some  extent  independent  of  entrepreneurial  choice.  For 
example,  until  the  1960s  virtually any  stock  market  investment  in Europe 
provided  high  returns.  The  picture changed  dramatically  in  the 1970s. 
Business  failures  accelerated  and  with  marked  relative price changes 
only  judicious  entrepreneurial  choices  led  to  success.  One  way  of  expres-
sing  this  change  is that  uncertainties  have  increased substantially and 
that  entrepreneurs  and  capital  owners  now  have  to assume  their true 
function:  to  take  risks,  to  innovate  and  to adapt.  Unfortunately, 
they,  too,  find  it easier  to  call  upon  government  and  their  belief  in 
<12)  Schumpeter  noted  already  that  the  rise of  bureaucracy is a  typical 
sign of  consolidation of  the Kondratiev-cycle.  See  Table 3  for data 
on  government  employment. - 19  -
governmental  non-interference  singularly ebbs  during  recessions.  It is1 for 
fnstance,remarkable  that  solutions  sought  for  industry with  large  excess 
capacities  such  as  the  European  steel  industry,  very  much  resemble  the 
cartel  and  market-share  arrangements  of  the  interwar period, and  generate 
similar  international  conflict.  In  some  countries overcapacity itself is the 
consequence  of  government  suppor~providing an  example  of the vicious  circle 
where  intervention produces  the  need  for  more  intervention.  Objectively 
many  risks are macroeconomic  and,  particularly during  recessions,  more 
difficult to assess or  to  influence by  individual  agents,  and  rigidities 
referred  to  before  render  adaptation  and  innovation  much  more  difficult 
now  when  it is  required  most.  Thus,  as  a  consequence  of prosperity and  of 
government  intervention,  a  once  flexible  economy  becomes  increasingly 
ossified.  This  ossification is more  serious  in  Europe  than  in the United 
States where  one  out  of 8  to  10  jobs  has  been  shifted in  recent  years  from 
declining  to  growing  activities.  Unlike  in  Europe,  the growth  of  new 
firms  is high  enough  to  compensate  for  firm  f-a-iLures  (Birch,  1981). 
(iii)  Slowdown  of  employment-creating  technological  progress  and  of 
innovative activity 
A argued  before an  acceleration in the application of  Labour-saving 
technical  progress  has  always  been  associated  with  the  downturn  of the 
Long  wave  (Dupriez,  1980).  Capital  investment  which  was  mainly directed to 
capacity  expansion  is  switched  to capital deepening,  and  the  obsoleteness 
of older machines  is  intensified.  The  backlog  of  technological  possibilities 
is  increasingly  exploited  to  rationalize  industry.  As  a  result,  and  com-
bined  with  real  wage  rigidities,  unemployment  increases during  that  phase 
of  the  cycle. 
But  how  can  one  then  explain the decline  in productivity growth 
in the  industrial  countries?  Apart  from  industry  specific  factors  (13)there are 
two  explanations.  One  is the  rise in  idle capacity during  recessions,  in-
creasing  overhead  costs  per  unit  produced  and,  when  transaction costs  are 
high, further·inc~easing unit  costs  as  variable  inputs are  not  adjusted  in 
proportion to output.  A second  reason  is to  be  found  in the  change  of  the 
product  mix.  If disinvestment  in  Low-productivity  industries is slow  while 
(13)  Among  industry-specific·factors are environmental  regulations.  The 
induced  productivity loss is partly ficti"onal, as  the output  (better 
environment)  is  not  part  of measured  output,  and  partly  real as 
these  regulations  introduced adaitional dtstortions. - 20  -
expansion of  high-productivity  industries is  hampered  by  rigidities 
and  increased  taxation to  finance  Low-productivity activities, overall  pro-
d  t .  .  h  d  L"  <14)  uc  1v1ty  growt  ec  1nes 
An  example  of  unfavourable  product  mix  is provided  by  subsidization 
of  the  agricultural  sector.  Labour  productivity  in agriculture is  in  most 
countries  substantially  Less  than  in manufacturing  and  private services, 
ranging  from  a  relative productivity  Level  of  0.35  in Japan  to 0.93  in 
the  United  Kingdom  (see Table 2).  Subsidies  to agriculture  thus  Lower 
aggregate  productivity  both  by  slowing  the  transfer of  employment  out of 
agriculture and  by  reducing  productivity growth  of  the  non-agricultural 
sector on  which  falls  the  budgetary  cost of  subsidies. 
The  phenomenon  of de-industrialisation,  that  is declining  employ-
ment  in  industry,can be  observed  in  most  European  economies  since 1973 
(see tables  2  and  3).  Even  if  released  Labour  was  absorbed  in the  service 
sector productivity growth  would decline:  industry and  in particular 
manufacturing, ha's often bee'n desfgnated  as  the  "engine  of  growth",  not  only 
because  of  its weight  in  GOP  but  because it has  growth-inducing  characte-
ristics that other  sectors  Lack.  By  "Verdoorn's  Law",  manufacturing  output 
growth  and  manufacturing  productivity growth  are highly  correlated  (static 
and  dynamic  economies  of  scale), while  "Kaldor's  Law"  relates manufacturing 
growth  to overall  growth  of  productivity as  non-industrial  sectors are 
characterised either  by  diminishing  returns or  by  the existence of  surplus 
labor,  or by  both. 
Graph  1  illustrates the trade off between  productivity growth 
and  employment  growth  for  major  OECD  countries,  for  the  time  periods 
1960-73  and  1973-80.  The  median  productivity and  employment  growth  rates 
separate the  plane  into  four  quadrants.  Most  observations  (average  growth 
rates  for  the period)  ly  in quadrants  I  and  III  indicating  the existence 
of  a  trade off:  high  employment  growth  is achieved at the  cost  of  low 
(14)  Thurow  (1980,  pp.  86-89)  estimates  that  for  the United  States about 
30  per  cent  of  the  productivity decline  in the 1970s  is due  to  idle 
c~pacity, 40  per  cent  to shifts in the product  mix,  and  the rest to 
industry  specific  reasons. T
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rationalization,  that  is,  Low  productivity growth.  Only  two  countries  exhibit 
a  different  pattern for  both  periods:  Japan  has  achieved  simultaneously 
high  productivity  growth  and  high  employment  growth  while  the  United  Kingdom 
has  achieved  Low  growth  rates  for  both. 
Comparing  both  time  periods  two  important  differences are noticeable: 
first,  the  trade-off  has  shifted during  1973-80  toward  the origin.  ALL 
countries  have  a  Lower  productivity growth  than  in the  previous  period and 
a  Lower  employment  growth.  Second,  the differential  country  performances 
have  narrowed  considerably  during  1973-80. 
The  macroeconomic  performance  masks  of  course  industry  specific 
factors.  For  example,  Low  productivity growth  may  be  due  to  economy-wide 
factors  such  as  Low  growth  of  wage  payments  or  Low  aggregate  investmen~ or 
to  an  inefficient  sectoral  allocation of  resources. 
Research  and  development  (R  & D)  tends  to  be  correlated with 
corporate profits  and  government  finances.  Consequentl~R & D expenditures 
start to decline  at  the  end  of  the  upswing.  For  example,  in the  United 
States,  overall  expenditures  for  R & D fell  from  3  per  cent  of  GNP  in  1970 
to  2  per  cent  in  1980  ' 15).  Moreover,  R & D expenditures  tend  to  be  redirect-
ed  from  basic  research  with  only  Long-term  results  to  short-run cost-saving 
innovations~ The  possibilities  for  new  technological  break-throughs are 
therefore  further  delayed. 
(15)  Thurow  (1980,  p.  85).  From  OECD,  Science and  Technology  Indicators, 
and  Community  services  the  following  data  are available: 
Total  R & D exeendituresl  as  % of  GOP 
*  *  D  F  I  NL  8  UK 
1970  2.0  2.0  0.9  1.0  0.8  2.1 
1980  2.3  1.9  0.5  0.9  0.6  2.3 
*)  only  government  financed  R & D. Graph  1 
- 2-3  -
Growth  of  productivity and  civilian employment  <annual  averages> 
for  major  OECD  countries 
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Particularly preoccupying  is the  innovative  retardation of  Europe. 
The  period of  reconstruction  provided  enough  impetus  for  growth  without  the 
need  to  develop  extensively  new  technologies.  Technology  and  management 
techniques  were  either already available or  could  be  obtained  from  the 
United  States  (the  technology  gap).  Despite her  technological  disadvantage, 
Europe  soon  became  extremely  competitive adapting  successfully best-
practice techniques  with  her  industrial  experience and  her  Lower  Labour 
costs,  but  remained  confined  mostly  in traditional  industries.  Europe  first 
did  not  feel  the  need  and  Later,  when  catching-up  in  standard  technologies 
was  achieved,  could  not  find  the  means  to  become  a  Leader  in future 
technologies  (computers,  electronics, aircraft,  space  technology,  etc.>'16). 
A further  aggravating  factor  were  European  Labour  migrations 
during  the  1960s.  In  the  absence  of  Labour  inflows  relative prices of 
Labour  in  the  EEC  would  have  risen more  strongly  in  the  1960s.  This  would  have 
provoked  an  early  restructuring  in  favour  of  human  and  physical  capital-
intensive sectors  and  production methods.  Instead,  Labour  immigration 
allowed  to  keep  wages  for  unskilled  Labour  Lower  than otherwise and, 
hence,  reduced  the  pressure  on  structural  change  and  innovation.  An  addi-
tional  and  perfectly  symmetric  escape  has  been  provided  by  moving  production 
to  Low  Labour-cost  countries.  While  the  Labour  emigration  and  capital  re-
ceiving  countries  doubtlessly  benefitted  from  this  process  and  growth 
therefore  became  internationally more  evenly spread,  it is also clear  that 
actual  growth  and  growth  potential  in the high-Labour-cost  countries 
declined.  Correction  of  the  errors of  the past  is  now  much  more  difficult 
with  the  EEC  technologically trailing behind  Japan  and  the  United  States 
and  her  economies  in  recession,  with  Low  profits and  a  stern time constraint. 
While  the  United  States did  not  traverse the 1970s  unscathed  the 
evolution of  the  U.S.  economy  has  been  more  favourable  than that of  the 
EEC.  In  the  United  States  where  real  wage  growth  was  much  slower  than  in 
the  EEC  (see Table  1)  total  employment  increased  by  about  15.4 million  from 
1973  to  1981  to  which  public  sector employment  contributed  with  an  increase 
of  2.3  million  additional  jobs.  In  the  EEC  total  employment  remained  about 
constant  over  the  same  time  period but  private sector employment  declined 
by  1.6 million  jobs.  Table  3  gives  growth  rates  for  general  government 
and  non-government  employment  for  the 1970s.  The  differences  in employment 
growth  between  the  United  States and  the  EEC  provide  an  illustration of 
(16)  The  Loss  of  European  competitivity  in high-technology  markets  is  shown 
in  Cardiff  (1982). T
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how  wage  and  other  rigidities contribute to  employment  destruction and 
points  to  the difficulties  in  the often attempted  explanation of  the 
decline  in  employment  growth  attributing the  cause  to  the oil  shock  or  lack 
of general  demand.  Furthermore,  the  current  recession  in the  United  States 
can  be  considered  partly as  a  deliberate policy choice to  strengthen the 
dynamic  potential  of  the  U.S.  economy  and  thus  as  a  preparatory phase  for 
the  next  industrial  revolution.  In fact,  a  major  process of  industrial 
change  and  restructuration  is  under  way  in the  United  States,with a  con-
siderable decline  in old  industries and  a  reallocation of  resources 
towards  fast  growing  and  innovative  service  industries  (financial  inter-
mediation,  insurance,  transport,  computer  software)  and  high  technology 
industries  (energy,  telecommunications,  electronics,  biogenetics). 
In  Japan  as  well,  despite high  productivity  in traditional 
industries,  major  reallocations  have  taken place and  new  technologies 
have  been  opened  (computers,  microchips,  electronics). 
E  .  h  t  .  d  b  h  .  'd  ' 17)  urope  1s  c  arac  er1ze  y  muc  more  r1g1  structures  , 
and  has  been  trying  to  hold  on  to traditional activities although  competitive 
advantages  have  not  been  lost only temporarily but,  most  Likely,  permanently. 
During  the  1960s  and  1970s  the  international division of  labour  has  been 
mainly  reflected  in intra-industry specialisation in  Europe  and,  unlike 
in  Japan,  very  little inter-industry specialisation.  The  list of  now 
threatened  industries  comprise  the  major  vehicles of growth  in  the 
post-war  period  such  as  steel  and  coal,  shipbuilding,  textiles, optical 
instruments  and  others.  The  growth  of  newly  industrialised countries 
(NICs)  will  provide  increasing  competition  in areas  such  as  automobiles, 
traditional  mechanical  and  electrical engineering  and  toolmaking,  whereas 
oil  producing  countries  have  gained  a  clear advantage  in  petro-chemicals. 
LDCs  have  a  competitive advantage  in the  production of  labour-intensive 
goods  by  the  Heckscher-Ohlin  theorem. Their export  drive exerts downward 
pressure on  real  wages  in  industrial  countries  by  the  Stolper-Samuelsen 
theorem.  In this  situation  real  wage  rigidities  create unemployment, 
(17)  Sachs  (1979)  shows  that  real  wage  rigidity  is  much  stronger  in 
Europe  than  in  the  United  States and  Japan. - 27  -
not  only  for  the  domestic  reasons already  indicated,  but  also for this 
Stolper-Samuelsen  effect  (Giersch  and  Wolter,  1982).  Since  labour  is 
faced  with  the  trade-off  between  Lower  real  wages  or  imported  unemploy-
ment,  joined by  capital-owners of  import-competing  industries,  a  strong 
Lobby  is  formed  calling  for  import  restrictions,  although  economy-wide 
efficiency  losses  would  be  created. 
In  the  1980s  the  EEC  is therefore  faced  with  increasing 
challenges  in its traditional activities,  including  agricul~ure, and  a 
serious  lag  in  future  technologies.  The  danger  of further  losses  in 
employment  and  real  income  is therefore considerable and  a  gradual 
erosion of  the  commitment  to  "free trade", already discernible now, 
is more  than a  theoretical  possibility. 
iv)  Declining  profits and  investment 
Economic  expansion  has  always  been  characterized by  high 
profitability of  innovations  and  of  investments  which  provides  the  in-
centives  and  the  internal  funds  for  further  investment.  However,  already 
in  the  late 1960s  an  unprecedented  acceleration of  real  wage  costs 
ewage  incomes  and  payroll  taxes)  occurred.  Combined  with  the downward 
rigidity of  real  wages  the oil  shocks  of the 1970s  had  therefore a 
major  negative  impact  in the  EEC  on  profit  shares  in  GNP  and  therefore 
on  employment  (Steinherr,  1982). 
Table  4  shows  that  the  share of gross  fixed  capital  formation 
(GFCF)  in  GDP  has  substantially declined  for most  OECD  countries  in 
the  late 1970s.  Short-run  complementarity  between  energy  and  capital 
in  the  production  process  is  such  that  high  energy prices  have  deprecia-
ted  part of  the  capital  stock  in economic  terms,so  that  an  increasing 
share of  investment  is  required  for  replacement  of obsolete capital 
(Baily,  1981).  For  well-known  reasons,  this effect  is not  properly 
measured  in  national  income accounts so  that  GDP  and  net  investment  data 
are  seriously overestimated. T
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v)  Economic  policies 
For  a  long  time  the  policy emphasis  in  industrial  countries 
has  been  placed  on  short-run macroeconomic  management  with  the goal  of  mini-
mizing  unemployment  under  the  constraint of  a  politically acceptable 
inflation  rate,  i.e., to direct  the  economy  to  a  preferred point  on  the 
Phillips  curve  whose  stable existence  was  more  or  less  taken  for  granted. 
In  the  pursuit of  macroeconomic  demand  management,  as  has  been  argued 
already,  the  long-run  implication of  policies had  been  somewhat  neglected. 
That  there might  be  a  potential  conflict  between  short-run stabilization 
and  long-run  growth  is  illustrated by  the  "paradox of thrift":  from  a 
short-run Keynesian  viewpoint  a  high  savings  rate might  increase unemploy-
ment  and  output  losses,  cet.  par., while  from  a  long-run classical  view-
point  a  high  savings  rate is  necessary  for  high  output  and  employment 
growth.  Since  the  long-run  is a  succession of short-runs,  continuous 
application of  Keynesian  policies aimed  either at  absorbing  excess 
savings  through  non  productive  capacity  augmenting  uses  (higher  public 
consumption)  or at  inducing  a  reduction  in private  savings  rates  necessari-
ly conflicts with  the  aim  of  high  growth  in the  long  run.  Only  anti-
cyclically  conducted  demand  ma~agement around  a stationary  trend  of  public 
( 18)  sector consumption  would  avoid  this  intertemporal  conflict 
In  fact,  demand  management  has  not  resulted  in anticyclical 
behaviour  of  government  expenditures  but  has  resulted  in a  steeper 
trend  increase of  the  public  sector's  share of  GOP.  This  provides  an 
additional  explanation  for  the  recent  decline  in  productivity growth: 
with  productivity  growth  lower  in the  public  sector than  in  the private 
sector a  more  rapid  resource  shift to  the public  sector  Lowers  aggregate 
productivity growth  (see  Table  2). 
(18)  This  constraint  can  be  incorporated  into Keynesian  models  through 
a  government  budget  constraint  for  long  run  equilibrium.  The  long-
run  effects of government  policies are then  substantially different 
from  the  short-run  results.  For  an  application to open  economies 
see  Steinherr  (1975). - 31  -
Table  6  illustrates the acceleration of  the  increase  in public 
sector expenditures  by  showing  government  expenditures  (not  including  state 
enterprises)  relative to  GDP,  and  the  increasing absorption of  private 
savings  through  government  deficits between  1960  and  1980.  Although  it is 
an  impossible  task  to  determine  in  some  sense  "optimal"  ratios  to  which 
actual  ratios  could  be  compared,  the drastic  increase  in public  expenditures 
in all  countries  and  the  increase  in public deficits, particularly.in Belgium 
and  Italy,  can  with  some  confidence  be  considered  as  excessive and  in  con-
flict  with  Long-term  growth  desiderata. 
Taxation  as  well  as  government  deficits  have  had  to  be  increased 
to  finance  the  rise  in  public  expenditures  and  this entailed  some  adverse 
Long-term  implications.  The  typical  forms  which  higher  taxation takes  results 
(19)  in disincentives  for  the  private sector.  •  Higher  fiscal  deficits, so innocuous 
in  the  standard  Keynesian  model,  have  adverse  long-run effects as  noted  above. 
They  tend  to  raise  inflationary  expectations  since  sooner  or  Later deficits 
are monetized;  and  they  crowd  out  investment  as both  compete  for  private 
savings.  Accumulation  of  increasing deficits  for  many  years  has  also  re-
sulted  in  high  public  debt,Limiting  the  scope  for  further deficit  increases 
at  a  time  when  recession  worsens.  High  real  interest  rates,  at  Least  partly 
due  to  the  need  to  finance  mounting  deficits,  absorb  increasing  proportions 
of government  revenue  for  debt  servicing  and  tend  to deepen  fiscal  deficits 
further. 
(19)  It might  be  objected  that  (a)  some  of  the  countries  with  the highest 
fiscal  burden  have  achieved  high  growth  (e.g.  Sweden);  and  (b)  that 
causality  can  run  from  high  growth  to  high  taxation or  from  high 
taxation  to  slow  growth.  The  hypothesis of this  paper  is that  high 
growth  indeed  has  made  even  more  rapid expansion of government  ex-
penditures  possible  which  in  turn  has  created disincentives  and  has 
slowed  down  growth.  As  to  (a)  even  a  fully  socialized economy  could 
achieve  high  growth~  but  the  more  economic  principles are  respected 
the better  the  growth  performance  can  expected  to be.  It could  also 
be  argued  that  during  the  1950s  and  1960s  the  policy  change  to 
Keynesian  demand  management  has  made  demand  growth  more  predictable 
and  investments  therefore  less  risky  (Shonfield;1965).  This  advantage 
of  demand  management  has  to  some  extent  been  lost  with  the  supply  shocks 
of  tr.e  1970s  and  the ·fact  that  what  was  initially considered as  an  anti-
cyclical  policy  resulted  in an  increasing  trend of  public  sector growth. T
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Once  private agents  realize  the  Long-run  implications of demand 
policy  (and  we  have  no  real  reason to  believe they  will  not)  even  the  short-
run  effects will  be  Less  favourable.  This  is  the  basic  message  from  the 
11rational  expectations  school".  Some  governments  are  now  so  uncertain about 
the benefits  from  counter-cyclical  demand  policies that they  are  beginning 
to  subscribe  to  the  view  that  expansionary  demand  policies during  recession 
may  deepen  further  the downward  trend. 
Built-in stabilizers  (that  is fiscal  expenditures  which 
fluctuate anti-cyclically such  as  unemployment  benefits,  and  government 
receipts  which  vary  cyclically)  and  the  need  for  structural policies also 
make  it difficult to  reduce  tax  rates or  the  fiscal  deficits during  re-
cession.  Mounting  unemployment  and  early  retirements  require  increasing 
transfers,  institutional  pricing  and  non-cyclical  behaviour  of  demand  for 
services  such  as  medical  care  impose  rising  costs  on  government  budgets; 
indexation of  pensions  and  an  unfavourable age  pyramid  add  problems  in 
some  countries;  and  investment  subsidies  to  encourage  job  creation  require 
additional  outlays.  Thus,  while  public  expenditures  have  increased much 
more  rapidly  than  GDP  this  increase  represents  mainly  transfer_payments 
and  government  consumption  whereas  the  share of gross  capital  formation 
in total  public  expenditures  has  declined  significantly over  the  Last 
15  years  in most  EEC  countries  (see Table 6). 
A Large  body  of  the  economic  Literature has  assigned  to monetary 
factor~and hence  to monetary  policy,  the  determinate  cause  of  business 
cycles.  The  best-documented  study of  monetary  factors  in the  Great  Depres-
sion  is  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1963).  Their  main  argument  is that  a  series 
of  shocks  beginning  with  a  sharp deceleration of  the  US  money  stock,  rein-
forced  by  the  stock market  crash  and  several  bank  panics,  Lowered  the money 
stock  for at  Least  four  years  by  magnitudes  never  experienced  before.  At 
the  same  time  velocity declined  strongly  in part  as  a  consequence  of  mone-
tary deceleration;  and  the  combined  effect of  a  Lower  money  stock and  Lower 
velocity depressed  nominal  income. - 34  -
The  analysis of  Friedman  and  Schwartz  is  focussed  on  the quanti-
ty  theory  of  money,  and  their maintained  hypothesis  is that  causality  runs 
from  monetary  factors  to  nominal  income.  Nevertheless,  in  their  theory 
the  business  cycle  is  not  a  purely monetary  phenomenon,  as  for  example  in 
Hawtrey  (1973),  since velocity  is  seen as  a  stochastic  process  also  in-
fluenced  by  real  factors.  An  exposition that  combines  in  a  very  fortunate 
way  monetary  and  real  factors  is Wicksell 1s  (1934)  11cumulative  process", 
turned  into a  theory  of  the  business  cycle  by  von  Hayek  (1941).  In a 
nutshell,  the  Wicksellian  cumulative  process  works  as  follows.  Expenditure 
is positively  related  to  the  excess  of  the natural  rate of  return  <the 
real  rate  on  physical  capital)  over  the financial  rate of  return  (the  in-
terest  rate adjusted  for  inflationary expectations),  with  equality be-
tween  both  rates  in equilibrium.  In  the  Wicksellian disequilibrium  process, 
banks  emerge  from  recovery  with  excess  Liquidity  and  to  expand  Loans  they 
Lower  interest  rates  below  the  natural  rate.  This  twists  the  intertemporal 
allocation of  resources  toward  the  present  and  stimulates  expansion.  The 
cumulative  mechanism  stems  from  the  favourable  effects on  the  national 
rate  of  both  expansion  and  Low  interest  rates.  Over  time,  prices  tend  to 
rise as  resources  are  more  fully  employed  so  that  the  real  money  stock 
declines  and  speeds  up  exhaustion of  banks'  excess  reserves.  This  would  Lead 
to a  turn of  the  tide  with  interest  rates  rising  and  the  natural  rate 
falling,Later  reinforced  by  the  slowdown  of  expansion.  Expansionary  mone-
tary policy  could  retard  the  turn-around  of  the  cumulative  process  but 
will  be  restrained  by  inflation and  the  Latter's  repercussion on  the  natural 
rate. 
The  postwar  growth  fits quite well  the  Wicksellian pattern. 
After  the  war  financial  assets  were  abundant  in  relation to  the  stock 
and  flow  of  goods,that  is,the natural  rate was  high  in  relation to the 
financial  rate,  which  stimulated  investment  and  consumption.  In the 
United  States  stagnation  was  prevented  in  the 1960s  with  a  monetary  ex-
pansion  of  unprecedented  size  under  the Kennedy  and  Johnson  Administrations. 
This  massive  monetary  expansion  engineered a  very  successful  acceleration 
of  output  growth  from  which  benefitted also  the  rest of  the  world.  How-
ever,  by  the  Late  1960s  monetary  expansion  had  resulted  in a  world-wide 
wag_e  and  pric_e  boom,  reinforced  b¥  the  commodity  price boom  in  the 
early 1970s.  The  recessionary  impacts  of  the oil  and  real  wage  shocks 
were  cushioned  by  Low  (at  least  ex-post)  real  rates of  interest which - 35  -
were  strongly negative  during  1973-75  and  still close to  zero after 1975. 
However,  it is  Likely  that  the acceleration of  inflation has  not  been 
fully  anticipated  by  the  market  so  that  the  ex-ante  real  rate of  interest 
exceeded  the  ex-post  rate with  the  effect  of  a  reduced  investment  response. 
Finally,  in  the  1980s,  real  rates  have  become  extremely volatile and  have 
reached  record  Levels  by  historical  standards  (especially when  adjusted 
by  output  prices  as  the  relevant  deflator for firms,  and  not  by  the  con-
sumer  price deflator),  while  as  argued  in previous  sections,  the natural 
rate  has  declined  significantly.  The  downward  cumulative  p~ocess seems 
thus  to  have  accelerated  in  the  1980s  as  reflected by  reduced  capital 
accumulation  and  more  frequent  firm  bankruptcies. 
The  recent  increase  in  the  cost of  capital  and  its greater 
volatibility is  to  a  Large  extent  due  to more  restrictive monetary  policy 
and  to  institutional  changes  in  monetary  management.  While  monetary  policy 
was  permissive  for  many  years  it has -more  recently  become  increasingly 
recognized  as  a  prime,  if not  the  single most  important  instrument  for 
reducing  the  rate  of  inflation.  Both  the  rate and  the predictability of 
monetary  growth  influence  inflationary expectations.  Hence,  to  Lower 
inflationary expectations,  money  supply  growth  has  to  fall  below  nominal 
income  growth  at  the  old  expected  price  path  and  must  be  expected  to  re-
main  restrictive;  under  these  conditions  expected  inflation will  decline 
while  nominal  interest  rates  may  initially increase  so  that  for  some 
time  real  interest  rates  rise  strongly following  a  shift to  firmer  monetary 
poLicy. 
These  arguments  explain,  at  Least  partly,  why  real  interest 
rates  reached  record  Levels  in  1982.  Furthermore,  high  inflation has  pro-
duced  greater variability of  relative prices  so  that,  reinforced  by  slower 
growth,· the  risk  premium  in  interest  rates must  have  risen.  Also,  if in-
vestors  are  risk-averse,  the yield  curve  of  the  term  structure becomes 
Less  positive.  The  short-term  market  has  therefore  expanded  at  the  expense 
of  Long-term  and  equity  markets,  rendering  the financial  structure of 
firms  more  vulnerable and  justifying an  additional  risk  premium.  For 
example,  in West  Germany  industry and  commerce  networth represented  30  per 
cent  of  total  assets  in  1970, as against 21  per  cent  in 1980.  The  downturn 
of  the business  cycle,  inflation and  antiflationary policies  together  have 
thus  created  non-diversifiable  risks  so  that  the  real  rate of  interest - 36  -
should  be  expected  to  be  higher  than  before the  downturn.  But  since equity 
returns  have  failed  to  increase  correspondingly  investors  have  increasingly 
turned  to  high-return and  Low-risk  assets  such  as  government  securities. 
The  crowding-out  effect of  government  deficits  has  therefore  been  consider-
able. 
In  conclusion,  policies  follo~ed for  many  years  in the  hope  of 
maintaining  high  rates of growth,  and  based  on  the mistaken belief that 
inflation might  even  stimulate production and  employment,have  consider-
ably  pre-empted  the  scope  for  demand  policies and  have  added  to  the  un-
certainties surrounding  future  growth.  It seems  unlikely therefore that 
traditional  policies  can  be  used  to  counter  the downward  trends.  Even 
if demand  were  stimulated,the  response  elasticity of  firms  is  Likely  to be 
less  than  what  it used  to  be  in  the 1960s.  The  high  cost of adjusting  em-
ployment  downward  during  recession  imposed  by  employment  protection  Law7 
combined  with  the  fixity of  capital  costs,render  firms  reticent  to  increase 
employment  and  capital  outlays  when  recovery  is not  expected  to  be  sustained. 
And  doubts  about  the  durable  nature  of  recovery  are most  sensible after 
the  experience of  the  Last  ten years.  Moreover,  the  incidence of  higher 
fiscal  expenditure  cannot  be  ignored  anymore  by  the  corporate  sector after 
the  very  strong  rise  in  payroll  taxes  during  the 1970s.  In  some  EEC  countries 
payroll  taxes  as  a  percentage  of  wages  and  salaries nearly doubled  in ten 
years  to  reach  more  than  70  per  cent  in  1981.  It would  be  difficult to 
argue  that  investors  should  have  expected this  evolution and  the fiscal 
incidence  represented  thereforeanex-post  depreciation of  capital. 
To  stimulate  recovery  it would  therefore be  necessary  to  reduce 
existing  rigidities and  to  redefine  a  durable  economic  order  which  would 
make  at  Least  governments•  future policies more  transparent  and  foreseeable. 
This  may  be  asking  for  the  impossible  and  in  practice there  is the  sub-
stantial  risk  that  policies are  changed  too abruptly from  Keynesian  stimula-
tion  to  (temporary?)  supply-side  inspired deflation as  may  have  been  the 
case  in  the  United  States and  the United  Kingdom.  However,  reversing 
inflationary expectations  is necessarily painful  and  requires  a  deflation-
ary  transition period  which  represents  in part  the  real  cost  of  previous 
Laxer  policies. - 37  -
The  greatest  danger  of a  prolonged  recession is, of  course, 
that  expectations  which  may  have  been  overoptimistic  during  expansion  Cor 
elastic  in  Hicks'  terminology)  become  overpessimistic  during  a  recession. 
In principle,  elastic  expectations  (a  reduction  in growth  generating  ex-
pectation of  further  reduction  in the future)  are  reversed  when  the 
economy  has  fallen  substantially below  what  are  considered  "normal" busi-
ness  conditions.  But  repeated  failure of  sustaining  recovery  as  during 
the  Last  ten years  is  Likely  to  Lead  to a  downward  revision of  what  is 
considered  as  "normal".  In  such  a  situation "a  secondary  slump  will  set  in, 
far more  dangerous  than  the first,  since there  is  Less  resistence 
available to  prevent  collapse"  (Hicks,  1939,  p.  298). 
4.  International  Relationships:  The  Sysiphus  Syndrome 
In  section 3  the  view  ~1as  presented that  economic  evolut-
ion  exhibits  Long  waves.  In this  section and  the  next  the  focus  is narrowed 
to  the  international  aspects of  what  might  be  a  post  wo~ld War  II Kondratiev 
cycle.  Upswings  are  characterized by  progress  in trade  Liberalization, 
increased  international  financial  integration and  general  spreads of positive 
externalities  (constructive  Leadership,  policy coordination,  etc.).  Down-
swings  in  contrast  are  correlated with  regress  in all these areas,  both  as 
causes  and  consequences.  The  emphasis  in  this and  the  next  section is placed 
on  the  forces  of  disintegration  in  present  international  relationships. 
4.1  International  Leadership 
The  increasing  interdependence of  national  economies  and  the 
integration of  regional  blocs  (EEC)  have  sharply  augmented  the  sense  of 
common  responsibility  and  the  benefits  from  international  cooperation. 
The  diffusion of  power  (United  States,  Japan,  EEC)  could potentially 
contribute to a  greater  role  for  constructive participation and  to a 
sense of  effectively  sharing  the  benefits  from  cooperation and  world 
trade,  but  also  creates  the  risk of  Leadership void.  Diffusion of power 
often  leads  to difficulties for  adopting  optimal  policies  requiring  sub-
stantial  policy alignment  (vide  the  failure of  the  Kissinger  proposal 
for  forming  a  consumer  cartel  to  face  OPEC,  or the dissensus  over  Loco-
motive  and  convoy  proposals;  or  even  within  the  EEC,  the difficulties - 38  -
of macroeconomic  policy coordination or of  reforming  the  Community  agri-
cultural  policy).  The  question of  leadership arises  therefore again  as  in 
the 1930s.  Kindleberger  (1973)  has  argued  that  the Great  Depression  would 
never  have  been  as  deep  if the  United  States  had  taken over  the  role assumed 
by  the  United  Kingdom  before  World  War  I  as  a  financial  world  stabilizer, pro-
viding  Last-resort  discounting,  offering  counter-cyclical  investment  lend-
ing,  maintaining  an  open  market  for distress sales,  and  enforcing  interna-
tional  rules  of  the  game  for  the  world  trade and  financial  system. 
The  post  World  War  II  institutions,  as  represented  by  GATT, 
the  IMF,  and  the  IBRD  were  entrusted precisely with  the task of  ensuring 
a  coherent  and  stabilizing  international  system  with  generally  accepted  rules 
of  the  game.  However,  dangers  are  now  visible on  many  fronts,  some  of  which 
have  already  been  refered  to:  the  temptation to  return to protectionism, 
the  reduced  control  of  the  IMF  over  the  adjustment  process  due  to floating 
exchange  rates  and  the  existence of  a  Largely  uncontrolled  Eurocurrency 
market,  the  inadequate  funds  of  IBRD  and  IMF  to  finance  Third  World  needs, 
and  rising  disequilibria  in  LDCs.  These  dangers  arise at  a  time  when  strong 
U S  L  d  h.  .  d  L.  .  C20)  d  l  f  . L.  h  h  •  •  ea  ers  1p  1s  ec  1n1ng  ue  to a  oss o  m1  1tary  egemony,  t  e 
dollar's  retreat  from  the  role of  a  monopoly  reserve  currency,  and  the  rise 
of  Japan  and  the  EEC.  In principle,this diffusion of  power  is not  serious 
since  such  a  small  group  of  countries  can  be  expected  to  be  sufficiently 
aware  of  internal  interaction that  it would  provide  for  the  public  good 
"Leadership".  Unfortunately  two  facts  render  the  Leadership  issue proble-
matic.  First,  "the  EEC  has  not  yet  acquired  the  necessary  internal  co-
hesion  for  effective  communal  participation in  such  group  Ledership" 
(Kindleberger,  pp.  307-308).  Second,  OPEC  and  the  Third  World  claim  in-
creasing  participation  in  control.  In  the  past,  international  institutions 
have  been  successfully  controlled by  the  United  States and  other  industrial 
countries  with  a  fairly  homogenous  Weltanschauung  and  fairly similar 
interests.  These  countries  were  therefore able  to  provide the  public  good 
called  "Leadership".  However,  as  the  recession deepens  and  as  regional 
imbalances  widen  consensus  within  the group  and  acceptance of  this  leader-
ship  by  the  rest of  the  world  diminishes  and  may  break  down  eventually. 
C2-0)''Wh-en  th-e  lim+t-s  -of  the  leader•s  capacity become  visible,  national 
rivalry  tends  to develop  and  that,  too,  implies  that  in the  countries 
recently grown  increased  popular  reliance on  state action will  make 
itself felt.  Eventually  even  in the  leading  country  a  growing  aware-
ness  of  the  costs of  leadership will  generate  demands  that  the  state 
deploy  more  of  its energy  for  more  narrowly  national  causes". 
J ..  Tum-l-i -r  (19-'7-8,  p •  7 ) • - 39  -
The  recent  positions  taken  by  the  United  States with  respect  to World  Bank 
and  IMF  funding,  and  growing  dissensus  between  the  United  States and  the  EEC 
over  issues  such  as  EEC  trarle  with  Eastern  Europe  (sanctions on  Poland,  the 
Soviet  gas  pipeline),  European  steel  exports  to  the  United  States and  EEC 
agricultural  policy illustrate the  danger  of  rising  conflict  among  industrial 
countries.  The  claims  of  LDCs  and  of  OPEC  to greater participation  (or 
majority  control)  in  Leadership  and  mounting  criticism of  several  features 
of  the  international  system  (multinational  corporations,  protectionism  in 
industrial  countries, conditionality of  IMF  Lending) represent  potentially 
serious  threats.  It  is  indeed  unimaginable that  Lenders  (industrial  coun-
tries)  accept  minority  votes  and  the  Large  degree  of  consensus  required 
for  effective  Leadership  would  most  Likely  be  Lost. 
4.2  The  international  monetary  system 
As  R.  Triffin  has  observed,  world  recessions as  well 
as  inflations  have  always  been  Linked  to  breakdowns  of  the  world  monetary 
system.  The  role  of  fluctuations  in  gold  and  silver production and  the 
associated adaptions  of  the metal-standard during  the  19th  century was  ana-
Lyzed  by  Fisher  (1932).  In  1931  the  gold-exchange  standard  based  on  the 
pound  sterling  collapsed  while  August  1971  marked  the  end  of  the gold-
standard  based  on  the dollar.  Although  Triffin  (1957)  had  pointed  out  the  in-
consistencies and  dangers  of  the dollar-standard  as  early as  1957,  the 
dollar-standard  Limped  along  until  1911  and  has  not  been  replaced  by 
another  system  yet.  As  a  consequence  of  the  belated abandonment  of  a  de-
funct  system  the  "dollar-overhang"  problem  built  up,  resulting  in 
pronounced  shifts  in  currency preferences after 1971.  Since  then  the  need 
for  international  Liquidity  growth  should  have  declined  due  to a  more 
flexible  exchange  rate  system.  But,  in fact,  during  the  1970s  international 
Liquidity  expanded  as  never  before  in  history.  As  shown  in Triffin  (1982), 
international  reserves  have  increased  rather  steadily and  moderately 
from  US  dollar 45  billion  in  1949  to  US  dollar  79  billion in  1969.  When 
gold -is  evaluated  at  rna rket  prices, i nternat  ion  a L reserves  more  than 
doubled  between  1969  and  1972  and  reached  a  peak  of  US  dollar 1.046 billion 
in  September  1980,  before  falling  back  again  to  US  dollar 662  billion 
in  June  1982.  The  Largest  contribution to  the  growth  and  volatility of 
international  reserves  is due  to  the  valuation of gold holdings.  It could there-
fore  be  argued  that  the  present  monetary  system  is even  more  dependent  on  the 
gold  market  than it was  in  the  19th  century.  But  even  if gold  is evaluated - 40  -
at  the  fictional  price of  US  dollar 35  per  ounce,  international  reserves 
still  represent  US  dollar  339  billion in  June  1982,  or more  than four  times 
the  level  of  1969.  The  maincontributor to  the  growth  of  international  re-
serves  has  remained  the  US  dolla~notwithstanding the  fact  that  for  the 
1970s  as  a  whole  the  cumulated  US  current  account  deficit  is negligeable. 
The  implications of this evolution of  the  international 
monetary  system  are widespread,  but the major  effect  is doubtlessly its contri-
bution  to  the  observed  instability and  disequilibria built  up  during  the 
1970s  in  currency  and  goods  markets.  As  noted  above,  the  end  of  the 
dollar-standard gave  rise to  currency  shifts that  dominated  the  excessive 
decline  of  the  dollar until  1979.  It also opened  the  door  to  an  excessive 
and  volatile  reserve  expansion  which  escaped  international  concertation 
and  control.  Thereby  it has  contributed  to  the  rise in world  inflation and  a 
more  irregular  financial  environment.  Financial  re-cycling  has  been  assumed 
Largely  by  commercial  banks  which  now  have  to  face  serious  problems  discussed 
in more  detail  in  Section  5.  In principle,  each  country  on  its own  could 
have  compensated  for  the  increased availability of  international  reserves 
by  more  restrictive domestic  credit  expansion.  But,  in practice,  it has 
given  policymakers  an  additional  degree  of  freedom  and  has  reduced  the 
constraints on  the  system  by  facilitating  financing  of external deficits. 
The  increase  in  international  Liquidity  has  to  be  seen 
also  in  the  light  of  the  reduced  need  for  international  reserves  due  to  the 
greater flexibility of  exchange  rates.  In  a  world  where  pronounced  currency 
shifts occur  and  where  it is difficult to  forecast  the  rythm  of  Liquidity 
creation  Large  swings  in  exchange  rates are  inevitable.  In this environment 
capital  movements  can  be  highly destabilizing  for  exchange  and  interest 
rates.  Although  no  currency price  is  determined  freely  by  market  forces 
without  official  intervention,  consider  the  case  of  monetary  expansion 
in the  United  States  under  a  purely  floating  regime  (for more  details 
see  Dornbusch,  1976).  The  impact  effect  is a  decline  in  US  interest  rates 
forcing  the  exchange  rate to  depreciate  immediately  by  more  than what 
ultimately will  be  required  ("overshooting")  in order  to  allow market 
participants  to  expect  an  appreciation over  time.  Under  these conditions 
the  (covered)  interest-rate parity  holds.  As  the  exchange  rate appreciates 
US  interest  rates will  increase again,  the  US  price  level  rises and  in the 
new  equilibrium  the  price  Level  will  have  risen proportionately to  the 
shift  in  the  money  supply  so  that  the  real  money  stock  and  the  interest - 41  -
rate will  return  to  their initial  levels.In the rest of  the world  exactly 
the  opposite  variations occur.  Thus,  while  under  fixed  rates capital  flows 
take  place  to  arbitrage  interest  rate differentials and  prices will 
adjust  upwards  in a  similar  fashion  under  both  regimes,  under  flexible 
rates  the  real  exchange  rates  evolve  cyclically.  Hence  under  flexible  rates 
a  considerable  additional  element  of  uncertainty exists  for  international 
trade and  the  adjustment  process  which  is  systematic  and  cannot  be  eliminat-
ed  through  exchange  market  interventions. 
4.3  International  transmission of  the  business  cycle 
The  world  has  become  increasingly  interdependent  through 
.  (21)  trade  and  factor  flows  (labour and  cap1tal)  •  As  a  well-diversified 
economy  is more  stable than  a  less diversified economy,  so  is the  world 
economy  more  stable  than  its constituent  parts.  This  is  not  always  perceived 
as  a  pure  advantage  because  interdependence  obviously  implies  that  not  only 
upswings  but  also  downswings  are  propagated,  and  not  only  exogenous  events 
but  also  policy decisions  make  their  effects felt  throughout  the  system. 
The  size  of  an  economy  becomes  important  for  the  policy options available: 
a  large  economy  is more  autonomous  but  ought  to  take  into account  reper-
cussions on  the  rest of  the  world;  small  countries  have  less autonomy  but 
they  can  more  easily neglect  the  transmission of their actions on  the 
rest of  the world  which  at  times  gives  rise to  the  temptation of "free 
rides". 
Coordination of  policies,  at  least among  the  major 
countries,  is  therefore of  high  potential  benefit.  However,  in difficult 
times  agreement  as  to  the  best  course  of  action  to  follow  from  the  point 
(21)  The  growth  of  world  trade  in  goods  and  services  started to decline 
sharply  in  1980.  Nominal  world  trade  declined  for  the first  time 
in the  post  World  War  II  period  in 1981  (by  1  per  cent)  and  the 
EEC  projects  for  1982  a  decline  by  5  per  cent. - 42  -
of  view  of  the  world  economy  is usually  hard  to achieve  since the  interests 
of  individual  countries,  or  their  understanding  of  how  the economy  works/may 
differ  substantially. 
For  a  Long  time the  major  difficulty for  policy  coordination 
(particularly  in  the  EEC)  was  considered  to  be  national  divergences of 
preferences  with  respect  to  the  optimal  trade-off  along  the Phillips  curve. 
Although  the  concept  of  the Phillips  curve  is discredited  today,  stabili-
zation policies still face  a  trade-off  choice  in  terms  of  the variance 
of  inflation  rates  and  the  variance of output.  For  each  country  the  slope 
and  position of  these  trade-off  curves  are different for  institutional 
reasons,  as  are  possibly  the  preference functions  of  governments  (Taylor, 
1982). 
Until  the  early  1970s  international  policy coordination 
enjoyed  the  benefit  of  widespread  agreement  on  how  the  economy  works 
according  to  the  Keynesian  paradigm.  The  scope  for  disagreements  was  there-
fore  narrowed  to  policy objectives,  national  interests,  and  facts. 
After  the decline  of  the  Keynesian  paradigm  in the  1970s, 
international  policy coordination  has  been  significantly hampered,  not 
only  by  diverging  national  interests,but also  by  the  Lack  of agreement 
on  the  effectiveness of  various  policy options.  The  monetarist  counter·· 
movement  has  increased  its political  respectability over  recent  years  and 
has  provided  a  basis  for  recent  US  and  UK  policy.  Thus,  the  consensus 
in  policy approach,  but  also  the  belief that  in principle recessions are 
avoidable  through  proper  policy actions,  have  faded  Leaving  behind  an  area 
full  of  doubt  and  controversy -as in the  interwar period. 
For  example,  the  present  emphasis  on  restrictive monetary 
policy and  the  goal  of  reducing  government  deficits are  considered  by  the 
US  government  as  a  necessary  precondition for  a  healthier  economic  en-
vironment  in  the  future  and  by  critics as  an  unnecessary aggravation of the 
depression,  as  in  the  1930s.  The  EEC  is particularly concerned  with  the 
spill-over effects of  deeper  recession  in the  United  States,  forcing  US 
t~~+ens  t& bee&me  more  aggressive  on  foreign  markets  and  crowding 
out  demand  for  European  exporters,  a~d with  high  real  interest spill-
overs  which  tend  to discourage  investment  in the  EEC. - 43  -
Against  initial  hopes,  flexible  exchange  rates  have  not 
insulated economies  from  the business  cycle  in the outside world.  The 
major  reason  is that  the  exchange  rate is  the  relative price of  national 
currencies,  hence  the  relative price of  two  stocks,  and  adjusts  therefore 
quickly  to  new  information.  Goods  prices,  by  contrast,  are stickier.  As 
a  consequence  real  exchange  rates give  rise to overshooting  with  real 
effects  spread  over  Long  periods of  time.  For  example,  the  real  apprecia-
tion of  most  EEC  currencies  in the mid-seventies  vis-~-vis the  US  dollar 
only  resulted  in  current  account  reversals  in 1980  when  the dollar had 
started already  to  appreciate  in  real  terms.  Overvaluation of  the  currency 
prior to  1980  has  produced  in  some  EEC  countries  (most  notably  in  Belgium~ 
but  also  in  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom)  a  decline  of  the manufactoring 
sector and  a  resource  reallocation  toward  the  nontradeable  sector which 
are  not  easily and  rapidly  corrected  through  an  exchange  rate depreciation. 
With  respect  to  the  Japanese  yen  the dollar  has  risen over  the  Last  four 
years  by  more  then  40  per  cent  although  the  cumulative price inflation in 
the  United  States  exceeded  the one  in  Japan  by  at  Least  10  per  cent. 
The  flexible  exchange  rate  system  has  doubtlessly  contributed 
to  the  adjustment  process  in the  seventies.  Despite a  tendency  for  exchange 
rates  to  overshoot,  market  forces  do  contribute to adjustment  of  relative 
prices which  would  be  much  more  difficult  under  fixed  rates.  While  specula-
tion  produces  bandwagon  effects  and  may  at  times  be  destabilizing,  Long 
swings  in  exchange  rates  cannot  be  attributed to destabilizing  speculation. 
It  is  the  uncertainty  surrounding  economic  policy and  the major  economic 
actors  which  is naturally  reflected  in  high  exchange  rate variability. 
But  the  risk of  a  foreign  exchange  crisis as  in the 1930s  or  in 1971  is 
smaller  under  flexible  rates,  although  export  competitiveness  and  imported 
inflation are  more  difficult to  manage. 
Some  consider  the  floating  exchange  rate  regime  as  poten~ 
tially dangerous  given  the overshooting  to  which  it gives  rise and  also 
given  the  temptation of  dirty-floating especially when  the  recession  worsens. 
The  situation would  then  not  be  unlike the beggar-your-neighbour  policies 
of  the  interwar  period.  Flexible  exchange  rates also  Largely  escape  the 
IMF's  control  and  therefore  escape  international discipline.  But  the  room 
for  manoeuvre  seems  severely  Limited.  In the  absence  of  exchange  market 
controls  interventions  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  correspond  to variations - 44  -
in  domestic  money  supply.  Hence,  depreciation  of the  currency and  higher 
domestic  inflation are  pairs  and  policy makers  only  have  the choice of 
impact  causality between  the  two.  Observed  overshooting  phenomena  should 
not  induce  policy makers  to  repeat  the  errors of  the  1920s  of  returning 
to  an  outlived  exchange  rate  regime  (and  to outlived  exchange  rate values). 
What  is  required  for  more  stable  exchange  rates  is more  stable monetary 
policy,  ideally  internationally  synchronized  (Emminger,  1982~ under  a 
reformed  international  monetary  system  as  argued  above. 
Models  of  international  trade stress the  international 
repercussions  of  a  shift  in  demand  with  magnitudes  depending  on  whether  the 
economy  is  relatively closed or  open.  What  is  not  as  well  known  quanti-
tatively are  the  repercussions of  a  supply  shock,  because  they  depend  on 
the  precise  nature  of  the  shock  and  the  phase  of  the  business  cycle. 
Thus,  if the  US  economy  expands  because  the  costs of  US  producers  have 
fallen relative to  their  competitors,  then  the  Latter \Jill  experience 
an  income  and  a  substitution effect  and  the  net  result  is generally 
ambiguous.  Thus,  it  is  extremely difficult  to describe  in general  and  un-
ambiguous  terms  international  transmission of  the business  cycle.  Trade 
interdependencies  are  therefore  not  always  stabilizing  in opposition to 
what  is  suggested  by  Keynesian  international multiplier models. 
4.4  The  interdependency  with  non-industrial  countries 
Into  this  category  fall  Eastern  European  countries,  OPEC, 
NICs,  and  other  LDCs.  OPEC  demonstrates  most  clearly why  trade  is 
mutually beneficial  and  therefore  why  OPEC  is of  importance  for  industrial 
countries.  For  the  other  groups  this  is  Less  clear.  Why  is  East-West  trade 
important?  For  obvious  political  reasons  but  for  no  compelling  economic 
reasons.  The  benefits  from  international  trade  stem  from  increased efficiency 
in  using  available  resources  and  not  from  finding  additional  markets  for  an 
existing  structure of  production.  Of  course,  the  fact  that  about  5  per  cent 
of  EEC  exports  go  to  Eastern  European  countries means  that  in the  short  run 
any  adverse  developments  there would  seriously affect  production  and  em-
ployment  in  the  West.  But  the  pattern of  specialisation is  not  such  that 
important  Long-run  gains  would  be  Lost.  Nevertheless,  our  short-run 
dependence  is worrisome  given  the  uncertainties  surrounding  future  develop-
ment  of  trade  (vide  the  Soviet  pipeline negotiations,  the curb  on  Poland's 
imports,  etc.). - 45  -
Other  LDCs  represent  a  similar qualitative case  although 
h  .  k  .  f  .  d  .  L  .  ' 22)  I  t  e1r  mar  ets  are  more  1mportant  or  1n  ustr1a  countr1es  •  n  contrast  to 
Marxian  predicaments  the  industrial  world  does  not  need  the  markets  of the 
periphery  to  avoid  its own  decline,  since there are still too  many  unsatis-
fied  wants  in  industrial  countries.  Nor  do  they vitally depend  on  raw  ma-
terials produced  in  LDCs  with  the  exception of oil and  some  other ores. 
What  is  important  is to  maintain  international  flows  of goods  to  avoid 
dislocation  in  the  productive  structure  (a  short-run  problem)  and  reduced 
efficiency of  the  international  division of  Labour  (a  Long-r~n problem). 
It is  very  Likely  that  LDCs  will  have  to  reduce their 
absorption during  the  coming  years.  The  oil-shocks affected non-oil  exporting 
LDCs  seriously.  Until  1979  an  improvement  in their export  prices  softened 
somewhat  the  impact  of  higher oil  prices and  LDCs  managed  to  finance  their 
external deficits,  thereby  Largely  avoiding  painful  curbs of expenditure. 
However,  with  the  recession  in  industrial  countries  commodity  prices are 
tumbling  and  terms  of  trade  have  again turned against  LDCs.  Combined  with 
very  high  world  market  interest  rates  and  the  reticence  of  industrial 
countries  to  increase  aid  these  countries  may  be  forced  during  the  coming 
years  to  reduce  their  absorption  growth  ' 23) 
(22)  IA  1981,  the  share  of  exports  to  LDCs  in total  exports  amounted  to 
38  per  cent  for  the  United  States, 45  per  cent  for  Japan,  29  per 
cent  for  Italy,  27  per  cent  for  France,  25  per  cent  for  the  United 
Kingdom  and  18  per  cent  for  Germany. 
(23)  Europe  is again  in  a  disadvantaged position in their  relationships 
with  LDCs.  While  Europe  will  feel  the  full  impact  of the  competition 
by  NICs  on  her  own  and  on  third markets,  for  aid and  trade  Europe 
has  particularly close  relationships  with  Africa.  This  is  the  continent 
where  growth  prospects  are bleakest and  where  therefore demand  is grow-
ing  Least,  while  need  for aid and  Loans  is  stronger  than on  other  con-
tinents. - 46  -
Demand  by  OPEC  is  now  expected  to grow  at  much  reduced 
rates.  A reduction  in  demand  is  not  unthinkable  even  in the  absence  of poli-
tical  conflicts  if  the  recession  in  industrial  countries  is  becoming  more 
severe.  Some  of  the  high  absorption  countries  such  as  Mexico  and  Nigeria, 
are already  hard  hit  by  Lower  oil demand.  They  seek  to  avoid  expenditure  cuts 
by  borrowing  increasingly abroad,  however  with  diminishing  success. 
Finally,  the  NICs  constitute fast  growing  markets but  any 
additional  exports  to  these markets  will  certainly be  more  than  compensated 
by  the  rapidly  rising  share of  their exports  to  the  world  market. 
The  evolution of  demand  for  exports of  industrial  countries 
and  the  penetration of  their markets  by  the  non-industrial  countries will  to 
a  Large  extent  depend  on  whether  protectionism  is  rising further  in industrial 
countries  and  on  the  possibility to  finance  existing disequilibria. 
4.5  Rising  protectionism 
The  degree  of  existing  trade  restrictions tends  to  be  under-
valued  in  what  appears  to  be  a  world  essentially oriented  towards  free trade. 
Free  trade is, at  best,  accepted  as  a  principle by  industrial  countries and 
even  there  only  partially.  In  the  non-industrial  world  trade  restrictions 
are  a  matter  of  principle and  trade  the  exception.  This  situation is defend-
ed  in  LDCs  on  the  basis  of  the  "infant  industry"  argument  and  in  Eastern 
Europe  on  a  political  basis. 
A danger  in present  circumstances  is  rising  protectionism 
in  industrial  countries.  This  has  always  been  a  feature  of  declining  phases 
of  the  business  cycle  of  which  the  last one  (the Great  Depression)  is most 
vividly  remembered.  Already  now  the  expression  "new  protectionism"  has  been 
coined,  reflecting  the  rising  recourse to non-traditional  trade  impediments, 
and  an  economic plaidoyer for  trade  restrictions is popularised  by  the 
"Cambridge  Economic  Policy Group"  ' 24'. Since  from  an  international  point 
of  view  it is difficult  for  industrial  countries  to  increase tariffs or 
quantitative trade  restriction,  and  unnecessary  and  suboptional  anyhow, 
(24)  This  group  has  advocated  for  some  time  protection as  a  means  to sti-
mulate  growth  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  more  recently it has  given 
similar  advice  to  the  Mexican  government  for  solving  its current dif-
ficulties.  If adopted,  the  change  in  policy orientation from  recent  ex-
periences  relying  more  on  market  forces  (Chile,  Argentina)  to using  pro-
tectionist measures  would  represent  a  full  swing  of  the policy pendelum. - 47  -
they  have  used  more  subtle means.  These  include voluntary trade  restrictions, 
government  contracts  reserved  for  domestic  industries,  government  assisted 
cartel  formation,  and  subsidies  provided  to  high  technology projects and  a 
vast  array  of  declining  industries.  According  to Tumlir  (1982)  the propor-
tion of  transactions  conducted  under  all  kinds  of non-tariff  restraints 
represents  now  between  40 and 48  per  cent  of  world  trade and  has  been  grow-
ing  by  at  Least  5  percentage points  between  1974  and  1980.  These  figures 
give,  of  course,  a  biased  impression  since  they do  not  include potential 
but  unrealized  trade. 
Clearly,  protectionism  is  harmful  to  industrial  countries 
themselves  from  a  long-run  perspective.  Perceived  short-run benefits  include 
avoidance  of  employment  losses  and  contentment  of  existing  interest groups. 
If  Losses  of  competitivity  were  only  temporary  then  temporary  protection or 
subsidization  may  be  defensible.  Otherwise  industrial  countries  take a 
heavy  mortgage  on  future  growth  in addition to  the  welfare  losses  of  con-
sumers. 
Trade  negotiations  among  industrial  countries  concerning 
European  steel  exports  to  the  United  States,  European  agricultural  policy, 
Japanese  car  exports,  etc.  tend  to  become  more  conflictual  as  the  recession 
lengthens.  (Capacity  utilisation  in  the  US  steel  industry is currently 
estimated  slightly above  40  per  cent,  as  compared  to  70  per  cent  of total 
industry).  Moreover,  the  repercussions of  increased  protectionism  in  in-
dustrial  countries  on  LDCs  would  be  serious.  LDCs  now  start to  realize 
that  the  "export-Led"  approach  to  growth  is more  promising  than  the alter-
native of  "import-substitution".  The  NICs  have  all grown  exc-eptionally 
fast  due  to  their  export  drive and  fully  exploiting  their comparative  cost 
advantages.  By  contrast,those  LDCs  that  favoured  Lessened  dependence  from 
industrial  countries  were  bound  to  accept  a  sub-optimal  use  of their 
factors of  production,  i.e., to forego  the  advantage  of  international 
specialization.  As  a  consequence  their growth  performance  remained  average 
to  mediocre.  Rising  protectionism  in  industrial  countries  would  slow  down 
the growth  of  NICs  and  tend  to  reorient  development  efforts towards  South-
South  trade,  even  when  not  optimal,  and  import-substitution strategies. 
Over  the  Last  decade,  LDCs  have  borrowed  massively  to 
sustain development  efforts despite adverse  factors.  Particularly NICs 
where  able  to  borrow  heavily  from  international  banks  to  finance  their - 48  -
investments. To  service their debt  NICs  must  be  able  to  compete  with 
industrial  countries  on  their  own  and  in third markets.  Other  LDCs  which 
are  mainly  exporters of  agricultural  products,  raw  materials  and  only  to 
a  minor  extent  of  manufactured  products  also  need  easier access  to  the  mar-
kets  of  industrial  countries  to  avoid  severe  cutbacks  in their expenditures, 
to  substitute  export  earnings  for  declining  aid,  and  to  service their  foreign 
debt.  The  risk  is therefore to  restage the German  reparations  problem  of  the 
inter-war period  in  the  1980s:  LDCs  receive  Loans  but  rising  protectionism 
prevents  them  from  earning  the  foreign  exchange  to  service or  repay  their 
debt. 
The  previous  arguments  imply  that  increasing  protectionism 
in  industrial  countries  creates durable  negative effects  (the  return to 
"import-substitution")and inflexibilities for  the adjustment  process.  It 
would  also  become  increasingly difficult to  push  for  trade  Liberalization 
in  LDCs  if  industrial  countries  do  the  contrary.  Thus,  even  without  ex-
plicit retaliation  (which  is  Likely  to occur),  rising  protectionism  by 
industrial  countries will  spread  to  the  rest of the  world  and  mark  a  durable 
break  with  the  post-war  evolution of  trade  liberalization.  The  impact  of 
rapidly  spreading  protectionism  could  be  disastrous,  and  not  at all 
symmetric  to  trade  Liberalization.  The  latter takes  time to  produce 
effects whereas  higher  protection  has  an  immediate  disruptive effect on 
demand  and  foreign  supply.  Exporters  will  therefore.see their traditional 
demands  fall  while  substitution toward  the  domestic  market  requires  new 
products  and  new  marketing,  which  necessarily  requires  time. 
It  is  important  to  see the  ramifications of the  impacts 
of  rising  protectionism  beyond  the  above-mentioned  supply  and  demand 
effects.  One  is  the  change  in  terms  of trade which  is  most  likely  less 
favourable  to  LDCs.  Another  is  the  repercussion on  financial  markets 
which  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  section.  Protectionism together  with 
a  financial  crises  could  provide  major  shocks  to  the  world  economy,  would  Lead 
to  increasing  cartelisation and  would  accentuate military-geopolitical  con-
flicts. - 49  -
5.  International  Lending 
In  the  1930s  international  financial  contraction correlated with  fi-
nancial  failures  in  industrial  countries  sparked off  international  conflict  and 
eroded  world  tradP.  and  economic  prosperity.  The  depression provoked  steep de-
clines  in  export  earnings of  raw  material  exporting  countries  through  the com-
oined  effect  of  their  low  export  diversification,  strong  terms  of  trade declines, 
and  restrictive measures  in  industrial  countries. The  same factors are emerging again 
now.  Furthermore, excessive inflationary policies during the 1970s force industrial 
countries to pursue restrictive monetary policies t.o.break inflationary expectations and 
hence  to accept temporarily high real rates of interest. Eastern European countries and 
LDCs  confront therefore the problem of slower growth of demand for their products, de-
·clining terms of trade, rising  ~mport restrictions in industrial countries and high interest 
payments  on  their  foreign  debt.  Foreign  debt  of  many  LDCs  and  some  Eastern 
European  countries  was  accumulated  during  years  where  growth  prospects  and 
expected  terms  of  trade  Looked  more  favourable;  had  it been  possible  to 
forecast  economic  evolution properly,  most  of  these  countries  would  have 
been  obliged  to expand  their absorption  Less  rapidly  and  to  borrow  Less 
abroad.  Now  it is, economically  and  politically,  much  more  difficult  to 
deflate demand  substantially.  Out  of  this state of  affairs arise  several 
serious  dangers  for  international  financial  stability and  hence  the  severity 
of  the  economic  downturn  which  are,  however,  impossible  to assess quanti-
tatively. 
5.1  The  increase  in  international  Lending 
International  banking  has  expanded  dramatically during  the  1970s 
and  has  assured  financing  of  a  Large  part  of  payments  imbalances  of  LDCs 
and  Eastern  European  countries.  The  exposure  of  banks  to  sovereign  risk 
is at  a  historical  record  Level,  exceeding  for  many  Large  banks  their  net 
worth  several  times,  while  the  unexpected protraction of  recession  has 
increased  the  vulnerability of  borrowers  in  industrial  and  developing 
countries.  Due  to  Large  interbank  Lendings,  difficulties of  one,  or  of 
several  Large  banks  would  therefore  rapidly affect  the  entire financial 
system  and  the  confidence  of  depositors  on  which  banking principles  are 
built.  Deposit  shifts  from  banks  in difficulties to  other  banks  would 
affect  the  Lending  ability of  the  entire banking  sector  and  provoke 
business  failures  and  scrapping of  planned  investments;  shifts  from  one 
national  banking  system  to another  would  strain exchange  markets;  shifts 
from  bank  deposits  into other assets  would  affect  the  stock  and  metal - so  -
exchanges.  Together  these  substitutions  could  provide  major  disturbances 
to  financial,  exchange,  stock  and  commodities  markets,  and  add  to  the 
danger  of  turning  the  recession  into a  severe depression. 
The  recent  weakening  of oil  prices  from  their  peak  in  1981 
has  not  compensated  other adverse  developments  for  non-oil  producing  LDCs 
so  that their  current  account  deficits  in 1982  are close to  those  of  1981. 
But  the  drop  in oil  prices  has  Led  to  very  Large  and  unforeseen  current 
account  deficits of  several  oil-producing  countries.  Growth  in  non-OPEC 
LDCs  has  declined  from  about  6  per  cent  average  during  the  seventies  to 
2  per  cent  in  1981-82  ' 25).  This  has  slowed  down  import  demand  but  export 
volumes  have  also  been  declining  due  to  close  to~ero growth  in  industrial 
countries.  Even  more  dramatic  for  export  earnings  is  the decline  in the 
terms  of  trade.  Since  Late  1980  dollar prices of  internationally traded 
commodities,  excluding oil, have  declined  by  35  per  cent.  The  terms  of 
trade  of  LDCs  are  now  at  their  Lowest  Level  for  30  years,  about  20  per 
cent  below  their  Level  in  the  1975  recession. 
As  a  result,  the growth  of  non-OPEC  LDCs'  export  earnings 
fell  to about  5  per  cent  in 1981  and  is expected  to be  around  - 7  per  cent 
in  1982,  compared  to  an  average  annual  growth  rate of  about  23  per  cent 
during  1975-80. 
The  decline  in  the  growth  of  export  earnings  combined  with 
the  attempt  to minimize  the  impact  on  domestic  absorption has  Led  to  a 
sharp  increase  in  bank  borrowing.  In  1981  net  Lending  to  non-OPEC  LDCs 
by  BIS  reporting  banks  increased  by  20  per  cent  and  that  by  US  banks  by 
24  per  cent.  As  most  of  these  Loans  are  short-term  and  carry very  high 
interest  rates  (including  spreads  above  LIBOR)  debt  service payments  in 
1982  have  reached  Levels  which  exceed  for  many  countries  their  export 
earnings  (see  Table  7). 
In  1982,  banks'  assessment  of  the  risks  involved  in 
Lending  to  developing  countries  has  become  much  more  pessimistic  .•  Monetary 
authorities  in  Japan  and  some  European  countries  have  also  taken  measures 
to  Limit  bank  Lending  to  individual  high-risk  countries.  Net  Lending  to 
developing  countries  has  therefore  been  declining  sharply  in 1982. 
(25)  The  data  quoted  in  this  paragraphs  are taken  from  World  Financial 
Markets  (1982). - 51  -
Table  7  - Estimated  External  Debt  Service Payments 
(%  of  exports  of  goods  and  services) 
1978  1982 
Principal*  Total  Total  Interest 
Argentina  70  179  44  135 
., 
Mexico  124  129  37  92 
Ecuador  74  122  .30  92 
Brazil  84  122  45  77 
Chile  74  116  40  76 
Venezuela  62  95  14  81 
Colombia  4-8  94  25  69 
Philippines  53  91  18  74 
Peru  142  90  21  69 
Turkey  164  68  13  55 
Korea  27  53  11  43 
Thailand  38  48  10  38 
Egypt  42  46  7  41 
Yugoslavia  20  48  14  32 
Algeria  42  39  12  27 
Indonesia  36  27  8  19 
Taiwan  16  21  5  16 
Nigeria  7  20  7  13 
Malaysia  18  17  5  12 
*ALL  debt  due  within  the  year,  including  amortization of medium- and 
Long-term  debt  plus  short-term  debt  outstanding at the  beginning  of  the 
year. 
Source:  World  Financial  Markets,  Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  Comp.,  New  York, 
October  1982. - 52  -
Commercial  bank  Lending  has  been  mainly directed  to  a  few 
fast  growing  NICs  and  Eastern  European  countries.  This  concentration of 
Lending  on  a  few  countries  increases of  course  the vulnerability of  banks  to 
any  adverse  developments  in  these  countries.  Among  potential  adverse 
factors  figure  primarily a  third oil  shock  and  generally deteriorating 
terms  of  trade,  rising  protectionism  and  continued strict monetary  policy 
in  industrial  countries  resulting  in  high  real  rates of  interest  in a 
world  economy  in  recession.  A particularly disturbing  factor  of  these ad-
verse developments  is  that  they  are,  in general,  not  country  specific  so 
that all NICs,  and  in  fact  all  countries,  would  be  affected simultaneously. 
To  the  highly  correlated  effects of  external  factors  have  to  be  added  adverse 
internal  factors  (business  failures,  bad  harvests,  political  turmoil), 
which  tend  to  be  Less  synchronized  however. 
5.2  Country  defaults:  some  preliminaries 
Consider  the  hypothetical  case  of  insolvency by  some  major 
borrowing  countries  independently of  the  underlying  causes.  What  is  not 
always  clear  in  discussions of  this  nature  is what  is precisely meant  by 
country  insolvency.  Is  one  thinking  of  a  temporary  shortage of  foreign 
exchange?  This  is a  Liquidity  problem  and  it would  not  be  unreasonable  to 
Lend  additional  exchange  to  service  the  foreign  debt.  Is one  thinking  of  a 
Long-term  incapacity  to  service debt?  This  is  an  insolvency  problem  for 
which  there are  only  two  solutions:  default  or adjustment.  Clearly,  even 
if exports  were  permanently  reduced,  say,  due  to  a  fall  in  terms  of  trade 
expected  to  be  permanent,  deflation of  domestic  demand  or  a  change  in  re-
Lative  prices  through  devaluation  could  always  be  used  to  reduce  imports 
and  earn  the  necessary  foreign  exchange.  Hence  insolvency  can  only occur 
as  the  result  of  a  political decision  not  to adjust  the  economy.  When  the 
perceived  cost  of  adjustment  exceeds  the  discounted  future  cost  of  default 
(which  depends  heavily  on  the  time  preference  of  the  policy maker),  it is 
perfectly  rational  to  default. 
What  are  then  the  problems?  It is perhaps  useful  to  start 
by  stating  what  is  not  the  problem.  Commerc1al  banks  so  far  have  found 
1rtternat~bnal  operations  extremely profitable - otherwise  they  would  not  have 
scrambled  for  that  market.  No  commercial  bank  has  experienced  serious  trouble 
due  to  insolvency of  international  borrowers  and  international  Loan  Losses 
have  been  inferior  to  domestic  Loan  Losses  by  a  multiple factor.  What  has - 53  -
happened  in  recent  times  is this:  when  banks  stop  Lending  to  a  country, 
official  Lending  was  made  available  by  international  organisations  and 
individual  governments  to  allow  increased  borrowing  and  servicing  the 
existing debt.  This  implies  income  transfers  from  tax  payers .in  industrial 
countries  to  borrowing  countries  but  without  disruptive effects on  the 
international  financial  system.  Thus,  the  risk of  serious accidents  in 
international  financial  markets  to  which  bankers  increasingly draw  attention 
may  be  rephrased  as  the  risk  for  banks  consisting  in  not  being  bailed out 
early enough  by  official  national  or  international  institutions.  However, 
bank  Losses  do  not  necessarily  represent  a  macroeconomic  problem  or concern'26); 
nor  is the  absence  of  bank  failures  a  reliable  indicator for favourable 
economic  evolution.  There  are  therefore two  distinct  viewpoints:  an  economic 
viewpoint  and  a  banking  viewpoint. 
From  an  economic  viewpoint,  the essential question is 
whether  short-run  current  account  deficits of  LDCs  and  Eastern  European  coun-
tries are  compatible  with  Long-term  "fundamentals",  that  is  whether  borrowers 
can  be  expected  to  earn  enough  foreign  exchange  to  pay  interest costs over 
the  Long  run.  Repayment  of  the principal  is only  a  subsidiary problem  since,. 
as  Long  as  interest  rates  are adjusted  to  market  conditions,the  real  value 
of  the debt,  Like  a  perpetuity,  remains  constant  and  there is no  economic 
reason  for  insisting  on  repayment.  If, however,  the  borrower's ability to 
pay  interest  over  the  Long  run  is  put  into question,  deflation of  domestic 
demand  becomes  necessary.  In  such  cases,  the  major  problem  for  international 
adjustment  and  financial  stability  is  posed  by  the  possible  refusal  of  some 
countries  to  adjust  their  economies  to  more  adverse  Long-term  prospects. 
Such  a  refusal  might  stem  from  a  more  optimistic  evaluation 
of  economic  prospects  by  borrowers  compared  to  those  by  Lenders,  reinforced 
by  the  short-run political  unattractiveness of deflation and  the  internal 
political  constraints.  Whether  any  country will  actually  renounce  its 
future  borrowing  potential  by  defaulting  on  existing debt  is,of  course,an 
open  question.  But  historical  precedents  exist  (Germany  and  Latin  American 
countries  in  the  1930s>'27).  Particularly governments  in politically unstable 
(26)  Country  default  was  considered  as  normal  as  individual  borrower  default 
before World  War  II.  Risk-premia  added  to  risk-free interest  rates  com-
pensate  Lenders  at  Least  for  the  ex-ante  risk assessment.  The  Lack  of 
default  during  the  present  period  implies  that  banks  have  accumulated 
substantial  risk-premium  payments. 
(27)  For  a  fuller  account  of  the  frequency  of  country defaults before  World 
War  II  see  Sachs  (1982). - 54  -
countries  may  prefer  the  short-run gains  from  defaulting  when  new  credits 
are at  any  rate unobtainable  over  the  Long-run  due  to  Low  credit rating_ 
and  deteriorated  international  respectability.  Temptation to default  is 
likely to  increase when  precedences  are  established or when  a  country  does 
not  act  in  isolation.  Even  formation  of  an  implicit  or explicit  borrower 
cartel  is  not  unthinkable. 
From  a  banking  viewpoint,  the  cash  flow  of  borrowers  is of  prime 
importance.  Banks  have  lent  increasingly on  short  terms  and  illiquidity of 
borrowers  obliges  banks  to  reschedule  loans  and  to  accept  a  maturity trans-
formation  of  short-term assets  into  longer-run assets  which  may  not  corres-
pond  to their desired  loan  maturity structure and  risk exposure.  To 
illustrate the difference  between  the  economic  and  banking  viewpoint  the 
requirements  for  current  account  financing  and  for  bank  debt  servicing can  be 
compared.  The  WEO  (1982,  Table  21)  projects for  1982  a  current  account 
deficit  of  about  US  dollar  100  billion for  non-oil  developing  countries, 
of  which  US  dollar 76  billion  represent  the  aggregate  trade deficit  and 
US  dollar  75  billion gross  interest payments,  partly offset  by  receipts of 
US  dollar  53  billion for  services  and  private transfers.  To  finance  the 
aggregate deficit funds  required  from  private  sources  are projected at 
US  dollar  50  billion.  From  the  banking  viewpoint  this  required  increase 
in  net  lending  is only part  of  the  story.  LDCs  are  scheduled  to  repay 
loans  totalling  US  dollar 140  billion in  1982.  But  the  current  account 
projections  imply  that  for  the  group  of  LDCs  no  net  debt  repayment  will 
take  place.  Hence,  the  aggregate  short-term debt  is either  rolled over  or 
transformed  into  longer  term  loans  which  might  at  least partly conflict 
with  banks'  optimising maturity structure and  country  exposure.  That 
liquidity considerations(banking viewpoint)  and  solvability  <economic  view-
point)  are  not  necessarily highly  correlated is illustrated  in  Table 8 
Argentina  and  Mexico  have  a  similar  cash  flow  indicator  (column  7)  but  the 
debt  service  ratio of  Argentina  is  only half  that  of  Mexico  (column  5). 
Another  illustration of  increasing  liquidity problems  in  LDC  lending  is 
provided  by  the  increasing  rescheduling  requirements  summarized  in  Table91 
which  often  force  bankers  to  grant  concessions  on  interest  rates. 
5-.3- Protrtems  of  internationat banking 
A recession  whose  severity or duration  exceeds  previously  held 
expectations  creates difficulties for  banks,  domestically and  inter-
nati_onally,  wh_ich  can  be  summarJzed  under  v_arjo~y_s  analytica~ cate_gories. T
a
b
l
e
 
8
 
M
a
j
o
r
 
L
D
C
 
b
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
s
 
D
e
b
t
 
t
o
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
c
a
s
h
 
f
l
o
w
s
 
i
n
 
1
9
8
1
 
I
 
'
 
1
 
1
 
2
 
3
 
'
 
4
 
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
9
 
I
 
I
 
1
 
l
 
I
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
N
e
t
 
S
h
o
r
t
 
I
 
D
e
b
t
 
D
e
b
t
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
A
s
 
%
 
b
a
n
k
 
b
a
n
k
 
t
e
r
m
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
 
n
e
t
 
f
l
o
w
 
b
a
n
k
 
d
e
b
t
 
d
e
b
t
 
b
a
n
k
 
o
n
 
m
e
d
i
u
m
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
d
u
e
 
d
u
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
d
e
b
t
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
d
e
b
t
 
t
e
r
m
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
1
9
8
1
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
1
9
8
1
 
r
e
c
e
i
p
t
s
 
r
e
c
e
i
p
t
s
 
S
b
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
%
 
S
b
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
S
b
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
%
 
$
b
i
L
L
i
o
n
 
%
 
g
 
b
i
L
L
i
o
n
 
%
 
M
e
x
i
c
o
 
5
6
.
9
 
1
4
7
 
2
4
.
0
 
1
2
.
2
 
6
0
.
0
 
2
9
.
2
 
9
7
 
8
.
4
 
1
9
.
8
 
B
r
a
z
i
l
 
5
2
.
7
 
1
7
6
 
1
4
.
3
 
1
6
.
0
 
5
8
.
0
 
3
0
.
9
 
1
1
4
 
1
.
5
 
3
.
2
 
V
e
n
e
z
u
e
l
a
 
2
6
.
2
 
2
5
 
1
4
.
4
 
6
.
8
 
3
7
.
0
 
1
9
.
9
 
7
7
 
1
.
2
 
4
.
9
 
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
 
2
4
.
8
 
1
4
0
 
9
.
9
 
3
.
6
 
2
7
.
0
 
1
2
.
0
 
9
3
 
3
.
2
 
1
6
.
1
 
K
o
r
e
a
 
1
9
.
9
 
5
8
 
1
0
.
6
 
4
.
0
 
1
6
.
0
 
1
2
.
9
 
4
6
 
1
 
.
1
 
6
.
8
 
Y
u
g
o
s
l
a
v
i
a
 
1
0
.
7
 
3
8
 
2
.
3
 
0
.
9
 
2
0
.
0
 
3
.
4
 
1
6
 
0
.
2
 
1
.
7
 
C
h
i
l
e
 
1
0
.
5
 
9
0
 
3
.
6
 
2
.
5
 
4
5
.
0
 
4
.
6
 
6
4
 
2
.
8
 
3
7
.
9
 
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
 
1
0
.
2
 
7
6
 
5
.
4
 
2
.
0
 
2
4
.
0
 
6
.
6
 
7
7
 
0
.
2
 
2
.
2
 
A
l
g
e
r
i
a
 
8
.
4
 
2
7
 
0
.
7
 
4
.
6
 
3
6
.
0
 
5
.
5
 
3
2
 
-
1
.
8
 
-
2
0
.
0
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
 
7
.
2
 
-
2
.
5
 
2
.
7
 
1
2
.
0
 
5
.
2
 
-
2
2
 
0
.
7
 
1
1
.
6
 
T
a
i
w
a
n
 
6
.
6
 
-
3
.
7
 
1
.
6
 
6
.
0
 
5
.
2
 
2
0
 
1
.
2
 
2
2
.
0
 
I
s
r
a
e
l
 
6
.
0
 
-
4
.
0
 
1
.
2
 
8
.
3
 
4
.
8
 
3
2
 
1
.
2
 
2
3
.
9
 
N
i
g
e
r
i
a
 
6
.
0
 
1
9
 
1
.
 
8
 
1
 
.
1
 
4
.
0
 
2
.
6
 
1
1
 
0
.
9
 
2
0
.
0
 
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
 
5
.
4
 
2
2
 
2
.
3
 
0
.
8
 
1
2
.
0
 
2
.
9
 
5
9
 
0
.
7
 
1
4
.
4
 
T
h
a
i
l
a
n
d
 
5
.
1
 
3
6
 
2
.
8
 
1
.
4
 
1
7
.
0
 
4
.
3
 
4
6
 
0
.
8
 
2
0
.
0
 
E
c
u
a
d
o
r
 
4
.
5
 
1
2
2
 
1
.
9
 
0
.
6
 
2
2
.
0
 
2
.
4
 
8
0
 
0
.
2
 
6
.
3
 
T
u
r
k
e
y
 
4
.
2
 
2
7
 
0
.
8
 
1
.
4
 
1
7
.
0
 
1
.
7
 
2
3
 
-
0
.
7
 
-
1
7
.
5
 
M
a
l
a
y
s
i
a
 
4
.
4
 
7
 
1
.
2
 
0
.
5
 
5
.
0
 
1
.
6
 
1
0
 
1
.
8
 
6
7
.
2
 
E
g
y
p
t
 
4
.
4
 
-
2
.
9
 
2
.
0
 
2
0
.
0
 
4
.
0
 
3
8
 
1
.
3
 
3
8
.
4
 
P
e
r
u
 
4
.
4
 
6
3
 
2
.
3
 
2
.
1
 
4
2
.
0
 
3
.
3
 
7
9
 
-
0
.
1
 
-
1
.
5
 
M
o
r
o
c
c
o
 
3
.
7
 
7
1
 
1
.
0
 
1
.
6
 
3
5
.
0
 
2
.
8
 
6
6
 
-
0
.
1
 
-
2
.
9
 
I
v
o
r
y
 
C
o
a
s
t
 
3
.
2
 
7
8
 
0
.
7
 
1
.
0
 
3
9
.
0
 
1
.
6
 
4
9
 
-
0
.
2
 
-
6
.
7
 
N
e
t
 
b
a
n
k
 
d
e
b
t
 
:
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
m
i
n
u
s
 
L
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
B
I
S
;
 
-
:
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
n
e
t
 
b
a
n
k
 
d
e
b
t
;
 
s
h
o
r
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
b
a
n
k
 
d
e
b
t
:
 
d
e
b
t
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
 
m
a
t
u
r
i
t
y
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
o
n
e
 
y
e
a
r
;
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
 
:
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
s
 
d
e
b
t
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
o
n
 
m
e
d
i
u
m
-
t
e
r
m
 
d
e
b
t
 
p
l
u
s
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
o
n
 
s
h
o
r
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
d
e
b
t
,
 
p
l
u
s
 
r
o
l
l
o
v
e
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
h
o
r
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
d
e
b
t
;
 
n
e
t
 
f
l
o
w
 
f
r
o
m
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
:
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
s
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
d
e
b
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
B
I
S
 
m
i
n
u
s
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
n
e
t
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
:
 
B
a
n
k
 
f
o
r
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
S
e
t
t
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
(
c
o
l
u
m
s
 
1
,
2
,
3
)
,
 
O
E
C
D
 
(
4
,
5
)
,
 
A
m
e
x
 
B
a
n
k
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
(
6
,
7
,
8
)
.
 
F
r
o
m
 
:
 
E
u
r
o
m
o
h
e
y
,
 
A
u
g
u
s
t
 
1
9
8
2
.
 
V
1
 
V
1
 - 56  -
Table  9  Debt  Rescheduling  (official  and  bank  debt) 
in  million  US  g 
1956  Argentina  500  1978  Peru  1.212 
1959  Turkey  440  Turkey  1.100 
1961- Brazil  300  Total  2.312 
1962  Argentina  270  1979  Turkey  3.200 
1964  Brazil  270  Zaire  1.000 
1965  Argentina  274  Sudan  500 
Turkey  220  Togo  220 
Chile  90 
Total  584 
Total  4.920 
1980  Turkey  3.000 
1966  Indonesia  310  Nicaragua  562 
Ghana  170  Yugoslavia  420 
Total  480  Zaire  402 
1967  Indonesia  110  Sierra  Leone  40 
1968  Indonesia  180  Liberia  35 
Peru  120  Total  4.459 
Ghana  100  1981  Poland  4.300 
India  100  Turkey  3.200 
Total  500  Uganda  730 
1969  Peru  100  Sudan  500 
1970  Indonesia  2.090  Zaire  500 
Ghana  18  Bolivia  460 
Total  2.108 
Pakistan  250 
Togo  242 
1971  India  100  Nicaragua  180 
1972  Chile  258  Madagascar  140 
Pakistan  236  Jamaica  103 
Cambodia  2  Senegal  75 
Total  496  CAR  72 
1973  India  340  Liberia  34 
Pakistan  107  Total  10.786 
Total  447  1982  Argentina  5.000 
1974  Pakistan  650  Peru  4.800 
Chile  460  Poland  4.600 
India  194  Romania  4.000 
Ghana  190  Vietnam  3.500 
Total  1.494 
Costa  Rica  2.600 
Sudan  600 
1975  India  248  Zaire  530 
Chile  230  Bolivia  450 
Total  478  Pakistan  447 
1976  Zaire  280 
Togo  340 
Senegal  300 
India  200  Honduras  220 
Total  480  Madagascar  120 
1977  Zaire  210  Guyana  110 
India  120  Malawi  98 
Sierra  Leone  52  Sierra  Leone  68 
Uganda  60 
Total  382  Liberia  58 
CAR  12 
Total  27.913 
From  Euromoney,  August  1982. - 57  -
When  either  liquidity or  long-term  fundamentals  deteriorate 
unexpectedly  banks  find  themselves  locked-in,  in  the  sense  that  they  cannot 
easily  refuse  to borrowing  countries  (or  to  industrial  borrowers)  in dif-
ficulties  further  loans  to service their debt  without  creating difficulties 
for  their  own  balance  sheets.  In  the past, banks  have  felt  compelled  to 
provide  an  increasing  share of  loans  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining debt 
service  flows.  Borrowers.realize  of  course  that  banks  are  locked-in  and 
can  therefore exert  considerable pressure. 
In  such  a  case  banks  are  in  a  dilemma,  the  crude  choice  lying 
between  continuing  to  increase  their exposure  or to  acknowledge  loan  losses. 
Although  in  an  economic  sense  both  situations are  similar and  banks  ought 
to depreciate  in either  case  their  loans,  in actual  practice banks  keep 
loans  in  their balance  sheet  in  the first  case,with  some  provisions  for 
loan  losses,while  they  ~auld be  forced  to depreciate  them  substantially 
in  the  second  C28) 
In  general,  as  long  as  borrowers  are  able  to pay  interest  rates 
no  real  problem  arises  :  the  cash  flow  and  earnings  of  banks  remain 
unaffected  although  not  their asset  rating.  If even  interest  cannot  be 
paid  anymore  and  if banks  estimate that  problems  are  temporary,  they  may 
roll  over  interest payments  as  well.  If borrowers  are  considered  insolvent, 
banks  have  to acknowledge  a  capital  loss.  While  a  bank  with  a  well 
diversified portfolio  should  be  able  to  cover  the  capital  loss  on  a  single 
borrower  with  net  worth,  default  by  several  major  borrowers  and  induced 
reactions  could  produce  failures  of  smaller  banks  with  inadequate  country 
(28)  The  loan  loss  provision  for  25  major  US  banks  represents  an  average 
of  47  basis points  of  loans  in  1981,  ranging  from  19  basis points 
for  J.P.  Morgan  to  67  basis points  for  Marine  Midland.  Over  the 
years  the  loan  loss  provision  ratio has  declined  from  a  record 
level  of  71  basis points  in  1975.  If  these  provisions  reflect 
banks•  evaluation of  risk,as of  end  of  1981,and  changing  risk over 
time,then either  public  discussions on  international  lending  risks 
are  exaggerated  - or  banks  are  incredibly inefficient  in  risk  evaluation. 
Source:  Smith-Barney-Harris-Upham Research,  September  3,  1982. - 58  -
risk diversification.  Panic  in  financial  markl!ts  is, however, not Likely to be 
created especially if Central  Banks  provide  support  as  in  a  case  of domestic 
(29) 
loan  losses 
Loans  provided  by  any  individual  bank  create a  negative exter-
nality  :  the  risk  associated  with  a  bank's  exposure  to  a  country  increases 
when  additional  loans  are  being  provided  by  other banks.  If all  banks 
operated  on  the  same  economic  calculus  this  would  not  be  a  problem.  But 
newcomers  to  the  market,  Lacking  the  experience  of  the  big established 
banks  and  determined  to enter  the market,  may  provide  Loans  even  whl!n 
established  banks  would  refuse.  This  behaviour  of  newcomers  is perfectly 
rational  since  they benefit  from  an  externality  :  the  marginal  risk 
associated  with  an  additional  loan  is  in fact  shared  with  all other banks 
already  in  the  market.  Moreover,  the  country exposure  of  newcomers  is 
small  so  that  if  the  covariance  with  their domestic  assets  is negative, 
their overall  asset  risk  would  in  fact  decline1 unlike  in established  banks. 
In  1982  it  seems  that  small  banks  have  cut  their  net  Loan  increases  much 
more  than big  banks  and  have  found  it easier  to  pull  out  of  risky markets. 
This  has  forced  Large  banks  to  take  over  additional  commitments. 
<29)  To  illustrate further  the  unlikeliness  of  large  international  bank 
failure  the  example  of  Citicorp,  one  of  the  internationally most 
exposed  banks,  is pursued.  End  of  1981,  Citicorp's assets  in  the 
Caribbean,  Central  and  South  America  stood  at  US  dollar 18.2  billion 
or  15.7 per  cent  of  total  assets.  Default  on  all  these  assets  would 
represent  an  annual  income  loss  of  about  US  dollar 2  billion.  While 
an  important  part  of  outstanding  Loans  may  have  to be  rolled over 
or  rescheduled,definite default on,  say,  10  per  cent  of  outstanding 
loans  would  be  an  extreme  assumption  by  any  standard  (for example, 
in  1981  international  loan  losses  amounted  to  US  dollar  41  million). 
Taking  this extreme  case  Citicorp  would  make  a  loan  loss  of  US  dol-
lar 1.8 billion which  compares  to  US  dollar 4.9 billion equity and 
to  worldwide  loan  Loss  provisions  of  US  dollar 400  million or  to 
US  dollar 63  million  for  the  region  on  a  prorata basis.  This  shows 
the  extremism  of  the  assumption  in  terms  of  Citicorp's  own  risk 
assessment.  On  a  flow  basis, definite default  on  assets  of  US  dol-
Lar  2  billion entails an  annual  income  loss  of  about  US  dollar 
250  million  which  compares  to net  income  before  taxes  in  1981  of 
US  dollar  855  million.  Thus,  while  large banks  could  possibly 
face  reduced  future  earnings,  collapses of  well-managed  banks  seem 
unlikely. 
Source  :  Citicorp,  Annual  Reports,  1981. - 59  -
A compensating  factor  is that  the  major  international  banks 
realize that  ill-fate of  any  Large  bank  will  affect all others.  This 
conscience  of  interdependence  creates a  positive externality,  in  the  sense 
of  willingness  to  participate  in  international  bank  co-operation to  avoid 
major  accidents. 
It is difficult to  charge  borrowers  risk  premia  compensat-
ing  for  worsened  economic  conditions.  On  the basis  of  the principle of 
adverse  risk  selection,  the most  desperate  countries,  which.  may  anticipate 
perhaps  never  to  repay  the  Loan,  would  be  the  most  insensitive to  spreads 
above  LIBOR. 
In  Loan  renegotiations diverging  political  views  held  by 
governments  of  Lending  countries  could  emerge.  The  debt  renegotiation 
with  Poland  provides  an  example.  While  European  governments  were  committed 
to  rescheduling,  refusal  of  rescheduling  could  have  been  seen  as  a  Logical  com-
ponent  of the· US  government's  preference  for  economic  sanctions.  In  such 
cases of  political divergences  the  Least  exposed  countries would  initially 
be  shocked  Less  and  therefore  be  more  inclined to  refuse  rescheduling, 
although  the  system-wide  repercussions  could  spread  the difficulties. 
Of  course,  debt  insolvency  is not  Limited  to  international 
Loans  alone.  During  recession  an  increasing  number  of  firms  in  industrial 
countries  become  bankrupt  '30)  and  international difficulties combine  with 
domestic  ones.  What  banks  may  not  have  sufficiently taken  into  account 
in  the past  is  the  covariance  structure of  their  exposure.  In the  inter-
national  context  individual  country  risks  are  not  independent  of  each 
other  (if the oil  price drops,  all oil-exporting  countries  have  Lower  export 
receipts).  A world-wide  recession also  implies  t~at all  countries and  many 
industries  in  each  country are  faced  with  increased difficulties so  that 
risks are positively correlated.  In fact,  domestic  difficulties  could 
as  well  spread  to  the  international  market  as  the  other  way  round. 
(30)  In  the  United  States  corporate failures  have  sharply  increased  from  a 
Low  of about  7.000  faiLures  in 1978  to 24.000 projected for  1982 
(Data  Resources  Inc.).  This  Level  has  only been  exceeded  in the 
years  1930-32.  Big  corporations  in difficulties  (AEG,  International 
Harvester,  Dom  Petroleum,  Chrysler)  receive  of  course more  easily 
governmental  umbre-Llas.  As  to  financ-ial  intermediaries,during the fi-F-st-9mOA-t-R-s-
of  1982  33  US  banks  have  failed and  three financial  scandals  have 
shocked  the  banking  community:  Drysdale Government  Securities,  Banco 
Ambrosiano,  and  Penn  Square  Bank. - 60  -
Finally,  in  recent  years  banks  have  had  difficulties  in aug-
menting  their capital  base  due  to  high  real  rates of  interest  so  that 
their capital-asset  ratio has  worsened  while  risk  has  increased.  The  capital-
asset  ratio of  US  big  money-centre  banks  has  declined  from  close to 9  per 
cent  in 1960  to  below  6  per  cent  in  1981  (The  Economist,  October  16,  1982, 
p.  24).  If borrower  insolvency occurs,  bank  equity  would  shrink  and  banks 
would  have  to  cut  down  on  Loans,  domestically  and  internationally.  This 
would  increase domestic  and  international  deflationary pressure.  In addi-
tion,  while  banks  have  exposed  themselves  perhaps  too  much  to  sovereign 
risks  in  the past,  they  could  overreact  by  reducing  too  much  their  exposure 
after  some  banks  ran  into difficulties of  countries already  in trouble  and 
of  highly  indebted  industries  in  those  countries.  Some  official  replacement 
ofcommercial  Lending  would  then  become  necessary. 
5.4  Lender  of  Last  resort  responsibilities 
Fast  development  of off-shore financial  centres  raises  the 
issue  of  Lender  of  Last  resort  responsibility.  If a  bank  faces  difficulties 
with  domestic  or  foreign  Loans  the  national  Central  Bank  would  act  as  a 
Lender  of  Last  resort.  In addition,  if a  borrowing  country  is  in  payments 
difficulties,  there  is  usually  enough  time  to  renegotiate the debt  and  to 
bring  in  the  IMF  or  governments  of  creditor countries.  More  problematic 
is the  case where·foreign subsidia~ies make  Losses  since supervisory  and 
Lender  of  Last  resort  responsibilities are  not  clearly defined  anymore. 
The  "Basle  Concordat"  defines  supervisory and  Lender  of  Last  resort 
responsibilities  in  a  way  which  Leaves  ambiguities  and  Loopholes  (see  Dale, 
1982).  The  most  serious  problem  arises  when  bad  management  (insufficient 
portfolio diversification)  puts  a  foreign  subsidiary  into difficulties. 
Central  banks  of the  headquarter  country and  of  the  subsidiary country 
would  naturally be  reluctant  to  provide  support,  the  information  Lag 
could  tend  to  be  Long  since  the  concerned  bank  is  Likely  to  cover  up 
management  mistakes,  and  there would  not  be  a  compelling  case  for  inter-
vention  by  the  IMF  or  the  BIS.  There  is therefore  enough  time  for 
repercussion  on  the  banking  community. 
This  raises therefore  two  related  issues.  One  is  the  Lack 
of  bank  supervision  (giving  rise to  Lack  of  information)  and  of  Lender 
of  Last  resort  responsibilities  in off-shore centres.  This  Lack  represents 
a  particularly vulnerable  nexus  in  the  international  financial  system 
taking  also  into account  the  concentration of  highly  Leveraged  financial - 61  -
intermediaries  (bank  subsidiaries and  non-banks)  in off-shore  centres.  Li-
quidity  problems  or  relatively  smaLL  Loan  defaults  could  more  easily 
develop  into  insolvency of  financial  intermediaries  in off-shore centres 
given  their  small  equity base. 
The  second  issue  then  is  how  to  cope  with  insolvency.  The 
Lender  of  Last  resort  responsibility is mainly  conceived  for  Liquidity 
problems  of  a  bank  in order  to  avoid  the  spread of  a  short-run private 
Lack  of  financial  intermediation  into a  social efficiency  Loss  affecting 
the  whole  banking  sector.  This  function  of  Lender  of  Last  resort  does  not 
socialize  the  entrepreneurial  risks of  banks.  Insolvency, by  contrast, 
is  usually  the  result of  management  mistakes  (excessive  risk  taking  and 
incorrect  forecasting)  and  automatic  Lender  of  Last  resort  support  would 
create a  moral  hazard  problem,  that  is, would  induce  banks  to accept  higher 
risks.  Of  course,  the distinction between  Liquidity and  insolvency  is of 
more  theoretical  than  practical  use:  at  the  time when  a  bank  cannot 
respect  its payments  anymore  it is usually  impossible to  say  whether  it 
has  only  a  Liquidity or  rather  an  insolvency  problem.  Quite often 
illiquidity also  Leads  to  insolvency  and  vice versa.  There  is therefore  a 
basic  dilemma  for  the  Lender  of  Last  resort  function  for which  there 
is only  an  ex-ante  solution:  more  extensive  supervisory control.  The 
control  of off-shore  centres  being  at  present  Less  extensive  than of 
domestic  banking  the  risk  is  considerable for  bank  insolvencies  in off-
shore  centres to  set off a  widespread  financial  crisis. 
Are  monetary  authorities  adequately  equipped  for  preventing  the 
spread  of  financial  "accidents"  ?  It is useful  to distinguish  domestic 
defaults,  country defaults  and  off-shore defaults. 
For  domestic  defaults  bank  supervision allows  in  principle  rapid 
intervention and  the  money-creating  power of Central Banks  sets  no  Limit  to 
Central Bank  support.  Panic  and  bank-runs  can  therefore  be  avoided  but 
not  the  induced  effects on  loan  and  foreign  exchange  markets  which  could 
be- dramatic. - 62  -
For  country defaults  the  speed  of  intervention is a  Lesser  pro-
blem,  decisive are the availability of  medium-term  funds  and  the  capacity 
to negotiate  adjustment  policies.  This  falls  mainly  under  IMF  "jurisdic-
tion"  and  problems  should  be  manageable  when  debtor  countries are  willing 
to adjust.  Whether  IMF  resources  would  be  sufficient  in  case  of  multiple 
Large  borrower  defaults  requiring  Longer-term  adjustment  depends  on  the 
increase  in  Fund  quotas,presently under  negotiation. 
For  off-shore defaults  some  difficult questions  arise.  In off-
shore  markets  bank  mismanagement  (excessive  risk-taking  given  Low  equity) 
is more  likely to be  the  source  of  trouble due  to  Lack  of  supervision; 
information  is not as readily available;  and  insolvency  is more  Likely  to 
occur.  The  open_questions  are  :  How  to  control  off-shore  centres  ?  How 
widespread  could  the  repercussion  of  off-shore  bank  defaults  be  ?  How  far 
can  Central  Bank  interventions  go  in bailing out  off-shore  banks  ?  How 
could  Central  Bank  intervention be  organized  ? 
5.5  Policy dilemma 
Even  with  an  increased  financial  basis  of  the  IMF  and  improved 
control  over  off-shore  centres it is unlikely that  accidents  and  deflation-
ary programs  can  be  avoided  in  the  near  future.  Industrial  countries 
themselves  go  through  a  difficult financial  phase.  As  they  are  rightly 
reluctant  to  support  unconditionally their  own  enterprises  in difficulty, 
particularly when  these difficulties are partly  due  to management  mistakes, 
they also are  rightly  reluctant  to  support  unconditionally  borrowing 
countries  whose  expenditures  are  not  consistent  anymore  with  present  world 
demand  conditions  and  relative prices.  As  in  the  domestic  sphere1 the 
policy  choices  are painful  and  severely  constrained  by  the  psychological, 
financial  and  unemployment  effects of  bankruptcy  or  country default.  The 
scope  for  disagreement  over  the  proper  adjustment  policies  is therefore 
Large  and  negotiations ·between  Lending  and  borrowing  countries  could  become 
increasingly difficult. 
The  economic  viewpoint  could  differ  from  this  banking  viewpoint 
in  some  respects,  although  both  fully  converge  with  respect  to  the desira-
bility of  avoiding  the  induced  effects  of  a  financial  crisis.  Banks 
naturally attempt  to maximize  their profits and  they  favour  therefore 
increased  IMF  Lending  and  stabilization programmes.  From  an  economic  point 
of  view  the  socialization of  bank  risks  is  not  necessarily desirable and - 63  -
deflationary programmes  might  go  too  fa~ both  in terms  of  welfare  Losses 
in debtor  countries  and,through  feed-back  effects,  in  Lending  countries. 
Furthermore,  investment  in  primary  resources  is  likely to decline which, 
combined  with  reduced  price  incentives for  resource  substitution  in  in-
dustrial  countries,  could  program  a  commodity  price boom  for  the  next 
recovery.  It  is therefore of  considerable  importance  not  to  be  overwhelmed 
by  short-run  liquidity problems  and  to  Limit  deflation to  those  cases  where 
Longer-term  prospects  are unfavourable. 
The  difficulties of  LDC  borrowers  can  be  appreciated  from 
the  necessary  adjustments  in  the  uses of  GNP,  that  is 
Y =  C +  I  +  G +  K,  or 1  =  C/Y  +  I/Y  +  G/Y  +  K/Y 
where  Y is  GNP,  C is  consumption,  I  is  investment  and  K the  current  account 
surplus  (deficit  when  K<O).  A general  deflationary policy tends  to  increase 
C/Y  and  to  reduce  the  current  account  deficit  (if  imports are proportional 
to GNP,and  exports  and  the  servi~e balance are  non-decreasing  with  GNP,  then 
K/Y  increases)  so  that  either  I/Y  or G/Y,or  both,must decline.  International 
cooperation  could  therefore  serve the  purposes of  ensuring  that  the fall  in 
I/Y  is minimized  in  order  to  increase the  future  capacity for  repayment  of 
foreign  Loans.  This  can  be  achieved  through  two  channels.  One  is to ease 
the deflationary  need  by  not  cutting  funds tooabruptly.  Equally  important 
is to stress  in  adjustment  programmes  expenditure-switching  policies and 
that deflationary measures  fall directly on  government  and  private consumption. 
Financing  transitorily illiquid borrowers  may  not  correspond  to 
I 
bankers•  preferred  option,  but  requires  much  Lower  opportunity  costs  than 
excessive deflations  (31 ).  Of  course,  the  practical  difficulty  Lies  in 
properly assessing  medium-term  prospects of  borrowing  countries.  (While 
banks  have  erred  in  the  past  and  will  err in the future there is, however, 
no  guarantee that official  lender  would  operate on  the basis of better fore-
casts). 
(31)  According  to  estimates. provided  by  World  Financial  Markets  <1982)  zero 
growth  in  net  new  bank  Lending  in  1982  (as  compared  to  20  per  cent 
growth  in 1981)  would  have  the  following  <roughly  estimated)  effects 
on  trade and  GDP  growth  in developing  and  industrial  countries within 
a  year.  Real  output  growth  in  non-OPEC  LDCs  would  be  3  percentage points 
Less  than  in  case  of  a  20  per  cent  increase in  net  bank  Lending,  and 
OECD  growth  would  decline  by  at  Least  1  percentage point.  The  trade 
balance of  non-OPEC  LDCs  would  improve  by  us  dollar 45  billion  (and  the 
current  account  even  more). - 64  -
A very  suggestive illustration of  the  potential  conflict 
between  a  banking  and  an  economic  viewpoint  is due  to  Sachs  (1982). 
Illiquid debtor  countries  have  basically a  choice  between  demand  restraint 
or debt  default.  Banks  must  make  a  decision  whether  to  reduce,  maintain  or 
increase  Loans.  This  situation  represents  a  two-person  non-cooperative  game 
which  can  be  represented  by  the  following  payoff  matrix,  where  the first 
entry  in  each  cell  stands  for  the  banks'  payoff  and  the  second  for  the 
debtor's  payoff. 
Debtor's  Strategy 
Demand  Default  restraint 
Reduce  Loans  (6,  - 3)  (- 6,  2) 
Creditor's  strategy  Maintain  Loans  (3,  0)  (-15,  6) 
Increase  Loans  co,  6)  (-30,  9) 
No  significance can  be  attached to  the absolute values of  the 
payoffs,  it is only  their  relative size that  matters.  Payoffs  to debtors 
increase  with  higher  Loans  and  for  each  Loan  Level  they are better off 
defaulting.  Similarly,banks 1  payoffs  are  higher  in  the absence  of defaults 
whatever  the  Loan  exposure  and  payoffs  decline with  rising  Loan·exposure 
given  the  strategy  chosen  by  debtors.  Thus,  for  any  strategy  chosen  by  banks, 
debtors  are better off  defaulting.  Similarly,  whatever  strategy  is  chosen 
by  debtors,  banks  are better off  reducing  their  Loans.  In  such  a  non-
cooperative game  the  outcome  will  be  C-6,  2), that  is,  banks  reduce  Loans 
and  debtors  default.  This  is a  "prisoner's dilemma"  problem  ' 32)  since a 
solution exists  which  is better  for  both  players,  namely  CO,  6):  debtors 
restrain demand  and  banks  increase  Loans.  This  solution,  corresponding  to 
the  economic  viewpoint,  can  however  only  be  realized  through  cooperation. 
In  practical  terms,  this  can  be  achi~ved through  IMF  intervention facilit-
ating  the  flow  of  Loans  to  the debtor.country and  increasing  the  payoffs 
to  banks  by  avoiding  borrower  default.  This  game  -theoretic  example  is 
also  consistent  with  the  relatively frequent  occurrence  of  country 
defaults until  World  War  II,  whereas  since  then  international  cooperation 
managed  to  avoid defaults  through  debt  rescheduling  and  stabilization 
programmes. 
(32)  This  example  is  a  simplification avoiding  the  dynamic  aspects  of  the 
problem.  It  is  well  known  that  the  "prisoner's dilemma"  disappears 
in  repetitive games.  Henc~ the  example  here  pertains best  to  these  cases 
where  governments  have  a  very  short  horizon  so  that  they  are mainly 
concerned  with  one  (the present)  game.  It neglects als the  interesting 
aspects  of  coalition formation  among  borrowers  and  among  banks. - 65  -
6.  Conclusions 
In  this  essay  three attempts  are made.  First,  to  show  that  slow 
growth  as  in recent  years  carries  the  potential seeds of economic  depression. 
Second,  to  resuscitate the  view  that  highly developed  economies  are not 
naturally  or  normally  growing  steadily,  barring  external  shocks,  with  only 
small  amplitude  short-run fluctuations  around  trend;  but  rather  that  eco-
nomic  processes  give  rise to  potential  Long  waves,  with  depression follow-
ing  prosperity.  While  these processes  should  not  be  taken as  a  resurrection 
of  historical  determinism,  they  suggest  the  existence  of  dynamic  forces 
underlying  economic  evolution which  may  make  it difficult for  economic 
policy  to  avoid  a  depression  in  the 1980s.  Third,  to  identify  some  po-
Licy  dilemmas  and  weak  Links  in  international  trade  relations  and  finan-
cial markets  which could produce  further  contractions of  the  world  economy. 
The  conclusion of  the  paper  is that  the  current  situation is 
already  very  worrysome  and  that  the stage  is set  for  a  potential depression. 
Since 1973  unemployment  has  been  increasing  year-by-year  in  the  EEC  with  a 
sharp acceleration after 1979.  While  GDP  at  constant  prices  had  risen at  an 
average  rate of  4.6  per  cent  during  1963-73,  this  rate has  declined  by 
2.9 percentage  points  to 1.7 per  cent  for  the period 1973-82.  Only  once, 
in  1975,  has  growth  exceeded  the  average  rate for  1963-73  and  the  years  of 
growth  contractions outnumber  the  years of  growth  acceleration.  In  no 
consecutive  two-year  period  have  growth  rates  increased since 1973  indicating 
that  attempts  at  recovery  failed  rapidly.  The  average  rate of  growth  since 
1979,  including  projections for  1982,  is close  to  zero and  thus  below  the 
average  rate of  growth  of  any  previous  post-1945  three-year period. 
Slow  and  declining  growth  over  a  period  of  9  years  is bound 
to affect  people's  expectations  about  the future.  After  the first oil  shock 
economic  agents  may  still have  considered  the  high  growth  of  the  1960s  and 
early 1970s  as  the  norm  to which  the  economy  would  eventually  return.  In 
the  1980s  it is more  likely that  this  norm  has  been  revised downward. 
This  chan~e in expectations  by  itself is a  formidable  obstacle to  fast recove-
ry,  and  any  policy that  Lacks  a  convincing  basis  for  an  upward  revision 
of  Long-run  expectations  is bound  to fail. 
essay 
What  is then  the  answer  to  the question  in  the title of  this 
"The  Great  Depression:A  Repeat  in  the 1980s?". In a  very  Limited - 66  -
sense,  a  repeat  has  already occurred.  Measured  from  peak  to peak,  the  u.s. 
average  rate of  growth  of  GOP  during  1929-37  was  -0.3  per  cent  or 3.3  percen-
tage  points  below  the  previous  peak-to-peak  average  growth  rate of  3  per 
cent  for  1918  - 29.  This  is  not  very different  from  the 2.9  percentage 
point  decline  in  the  trend growth  for  the  EEC  during  1973-82. 
This  comparison  is obviously  somewhat  misleading~  Stow  growth 
is more  easily acceptable  and  imposes  less  hardship at the  high  levels of 
per  capita  income  in  the  1980s  than it was  in the  1930s,  and  several 
sociological  and  institutional  factors dampen  today  the  social  repercussions 
of  the  recession.  Current  unemployment,  although  unacceptably  high,  is 
still far  below  peak  unemployment  in the  1930s.  Moreover,  the  most 
spectacular feature  of  the  Great  Depression  remains  the 40  per  cent 
decline  in  US  real  GOP  in  the  span of only 3  years.  Thanks  to  the built-in 
stabilizers and  institutional  safeguards  developed  since then  it is very 
unlikely  that  such  a  catastrophic  downturn  could  happen  ~gain.  If any-
thing,  the  current  recession might be drawn 'out  and  become  gradually more 
severe.  Those  contractionary forces  and  institutional  problems  that 
might  accentuate the  current  recession are discussed  in great  length  in 
this essay. 
The  Legacy  of past  policy decisions  is a  serious  burden  on 
recovery  and  Limits  future  policy options  severely.  Taken  one  by  one, 
none  of  the features  of  the business  cycle and none  of  the potential 
accidents  is  likely to  push  the  world  into a  deep  depression before  counter-
vailing  measures  could  be  taken.  However,  inadequate  policy  responses  or 
simultaneity of  problem  occurrence  coutd  slowly do  that  - and,  in fact, 
most  of  the  possible  trouble areas  mentioned  in this essay are  interconnect-
ed.  For  example,  if the  recession  lengthens or if another oil  shock 
occurs,  the deficits of  LDCs  will  increase further  and  the  real  income  of 
industrial  countries  will  decline  as  well.  LDCs  will  have  to  curb their 
absorption  and  some  of  them  could  become  insolvent  because  banks  are al-
ready  overexposed  and  industrial  countries  have  to  cope  with  their own 
income  losses.  There  could  then  be  snowballing  repercussions on  the  Euro-
currency market.  Furthermore,  those  industrial  countries with  greater 
rigidities would  he  mo_st  affec_ted  and  would  therefore be  tempted  to  re-
sort  to  trade  restrictions which  could  then  be  spread  internationally and 
produce  repercussions  on  financial  markets.  The  length  of the chain  can  be 
adjusted at  will  but  it is clear that  the  scenario for  a  cumulative down-
turn  would  be  set. - 67  -
At  each  nexus  of  the  chain  there are,  of  course,  policy options. 
But  one  cannot  be  sure that all major  actors will  always  bear  the "public 
goods"  aspect  in domestic  affairs and  in  international  relations  in mind. 
Therefore,  a  combination of  disturbances or of  contractionary dynamic  pro-
cesses,with  inadequate  policy  reponses  in  the  present  phase  of  the business 
cycle1 represents  a  serious  concern  for  the  near future.  Any  such  scenario, 
and  there are  infinite combinations  of  them,  appears  to  be  as  much  of  a 
danger  as  the  potential  disruption created  by  a  single,  uncontrollable 
event  (a  third oil  shock,  war). 
To  conclude,some  limitations of the  scope  of this  essay are 
noted.  This  essay  stresses  the  implications of  the  accumulation of  un-
sustainable disequilibria  during  postwar  expansion  ("the  boom  waxes  fast 
and  furious"  to  use  Hicks'  expression)  and  the  onset  of  contractionary 
forces  during  the  1970s.  It deliberately neglects  latent  expansionary  forces 
which  are at  present still checked  by  contractionary ones,  and  slowly 
developing  changes  in  the  perception of  the  role of  economic  policies 
after the fall  from  grace  of  the  Keynesian  paradigm. 
It is quite  conceivable  that  a  new  wave  of  expansion  is not  too  far away, 
particularly since the  time  span  required  for  economic  utilization of 
technological developments has  been  reduced  drastically.  Innovations  in 
automation,  communication,  biotechnology  and  development  of  new  materials 
and  raw  material  sources  open  vast  new  economic  territories, within which 
our  social  values  and  Life  patterns will  be  deeply  affected.  For  this 
take-off  to materialize  the  current  structural  imbalances  need  correction 
and  the  forces  of  economic  dynamics  have  to  be  unchained  to  recreate 
"Prometheus  unbound"  (Landes).  Also  in this  respect  new  trends  can  be 
discerned.  Those  governments  that  shaped  economic  policy  in the  1970s~ 
and  that  were  responsible for  the  evolution of  a  more  defensive and  rigid 
rather  than  flexible  and  creative economic  orde~ have  virtually all been 
replaced  recently  by  governments  voted  into office on  the basis of their 
promises  to  reverse  this evolution.  Deregulation·of  industries,  reexamina-
tion of  the  incentive compatibility of transfer  payments  and  of  tax 
structures,control  of  the  expansion of  public  expenditures  and  of government 
deficitsand determination  to  stem  the growth  of  real  wage  costs  are  some 
of the  standard  courses on  the menus  offered  by  recent  vintage governments. - 68  -
Social  attitudes and  voter's  behaviour  suggest  that  a 
mutation  may  have  occurred  in  the  social  value  system  and  in the  per-
ception of  the  role  and  scope  of  economic  policy.  During  the 1970s 
concern  over  man's  environment,  disillusionment  with  economic  growth  as 
a  dance  around  the  golden calf,  and  alienation  in  techno-bureaucratic 
structures  and  automated  work  places  have  been  growing  sharply.  The 
postwar  enchantment  with  economic  progress  and  elastic expectations of 
an  even  better  and  riskless future  have  come  to  a  halt  in the  1970s. 
These  are  important  elements  of  the current  malaise  which  render 
traditional  solutions  Less  widely  acceptable.  But  it suggests  also 
new  opportunities  and  complementary  alternatives  when  the material  oppor-
tunity  costs  are  properly  taken  into account.  Safer  and  cleaner  energies 
can  be  made  available if  consumers  are willing  to  pay  the  price,  the 
environment  can  be  improved  if  consumer  preferences  can  be  established 
and  public  good  pricing  rules  are efficiently applied,  job  content  and 
the  workplace  can  be  enriched  and  improved  and  more  Leisure,  education, 
social  services  ..  or  health  care  can  be  consumed  in exchange  for  Lower 
consumption  of  material  goods.  ALL  this  can  be  done  without  Losses  in 
social  efficiency,when  proper  allocation mechanisms  are  used  and  when 
it is fully  realized  that  even  our  rich  economies  have  Limited  resources 
so  that  nothing  can  be  obtained  for free.  A qualitative change  in the 
allocation of  resources  is by  no  means  a  retarding  factor  and  could 
even  favour  economic  growth  properly measured.  But  while  there  is a 
choice  about  the \nature  of  the  benefits  from  growth  (more  Leisure or 
more  GDP),  zero or  negative growth  (measured  by  an  index  of  social 
welfare)  is  no  realistic alternative.  Marx  was  certainly right  in  pointing 
out  that  social  equilibrium  in  a  non-growing  economy  is a  Logical  contra-
diction  (but  he  was  wrong  in  believing  that  this is specific  to capitalist 
societies). 
The  rational  for  economic  growth  can  only  be  improvement  of 
social  welfare  in  a  world  of  non-saturated  wants.  Historically,  engrained 
patterns of  behaviour,  fights  over  the distribution of  income,  and 
frictions  in the  reallocation of  resources  and  in the  process  of societal 
change  have  always  rendered qualitative mutations  controversial.  It 
could  well  be  that  the  1970s  mark  the  end  of a  golden-calf  process of 
growth  and  the  beginning  of  a  qualitatively different  process  for  the - 69  -
last generation  of  this millenium.  It might  then turn out that the 
current  recession  was  only  the  necessary  frictional  and  structural  cost 
for  achieving  a  qualitative  jump.  Maybe. 
* 
*  * - 70  -
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